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FOOLISH CONSISTENCIES AND THE APPELLATE REVIEW 
OF COURTS-MARTIAL 
John F. O’Connor* 
The most pronounced adverse impact [of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice] upon the military justice system appears in the intricacies and 
delays attending appellate review.  Since convicted persons have a 
right to appeal they may delay the final disposition of cases although 
the petition for review may be entirely without merit and even when it 
follows an original plea of guilty.  Moreover, because of delays in the 
appeal process, convicted persons receiving short sentences of 
confinement may have served their sentences before the procedure 
prescribed by the Code is completed. . . .  This involves great expense 
to the taxpayer and, because of the frivolous nature of the appeal, is 
generally of no value to the accused.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The post-September 11, 2001 world has highlighted an important 
evolution in the way that the United States military justice system is 
perceived by courts, legal scholars, journalists, and the public at large.2  
With extensive media reporting of military operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, a spotlight has been shone on the military justice system as it 
* Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP.  B.A., University of Rochester; M.S.Sc., Syracuse University; 
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law.  The author served as an officer in the United States 
Marine Corps from 1988 to 1998, including service as a judge advocate from 1995 to 1998.  The 
views expressed herein are those of the author only, and do not reflect the views of Steptoe & 
Johnson LLP or its attorneys or clients. 
 1. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SEMI-ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 1 JANUARY TO JUNE 30, 1953, 122 (1953), quoted in 
George S. Prugh, Jr., Observations on the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 1954 and 2000, 165 
MIL. L. REV. 21, 27-28 (2000). 
 2. James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the 
Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 693 (2006) (referencing 
December 2002 news article as “the first evidence that criticism of the military justice system had 
made its way to the mainstream press”). 
1
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has tackled a number of issues relating to these military operations.3 
Journalists and legal scholars have written extensively about the reports 
of detainee abuse from Iraq, most notably at Abu Ghraib prison, and the 
court-martial proceedings flowing therefrom.4  Courts-martial of 
servicemembers refusing to deploy to Iraq, based either on their 
contention that the Iraq war is illegal5 or on their claims of conscientious 
objector status,6 have piqued the public’s interest as part of the larger 
debate on the Iraq war.  In assessing the legality of military commissions 
created to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Supreme Court 
considered the due process protections inherent in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”),7 the criminal code for trying 
servicemembers by court-martial.8 
What is particularly striking is the shift in public and scholarly 
perceptions of the military justice system as compared to those 
expressed in the Vietnam War era.  With the United States mired in a 
Vietnam War that was unpopular in many quarters, courts’ and scholars’ 
treatment of the military justice system bordered on derision.9  The title 
of a popular Vietnam-era book offered a characteristically glib put-down 
of the military justice system: Military Justice is to Justice as Military 
Music is to Music.10  Congress, animated by its own perceptions of the 
 3. See, e.g., Michael J. Davidson, Congressional Investigations & Their Effect on 
Subsequent Military Prosecutions, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 281, 325-26 & n.254 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., id; U.S. Military Justice Proceedings Involving Alleged Offenses Against 
Protected Persons, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 713, 713-15 (2005); Additional U.S. Military Justice 
Proceedings Against Servicemembers for Alleged Abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan, 99 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 503, 503-05 (2005). 
 5. See, e.g., Rone Tempest, They Also Serve Their Conscience, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 8121286 (referencing Army court-martial of officer who refused 
deployment to Iraq on grounds that deployment was illegal); Army War Resister Takes on New 
Lawyers for Retrial, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 6, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 
6740241. 
 6. See, e.g., Mary Spicuzza, An Army of Uno, S.F. WEEKLY, June 20, 2007, available at 
2007 WLNR 12386348 (detailing court-martial of sailor court-martialed for refusing to deploy with 
his ship after the Navy denied his application for conscientious objector status). 
 7. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006) [hereinafter U.C.M.J.]. 
 8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786-93 (2006). 
 9. See, e.g., ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO 
MUSIC 212-13 (1970) (“Justice is too important to be left to the military.  If military justice is 
corrupt – and it is – sooner or later it will corrupt civilian justice.”). 
 10. Id.; see also Robert E. Montgomery, Jr., Comment, God, the Army, and Judicial Review: 
The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CAL. L. REV. 379, 447 (1968) (questioning the ability of 
the military justice system to safeguard the rights of soldiers claiming conscientious objector status); 
Howard E. Cohen, Comment, The Discredit Clause of the UCMJ: An Unrestricted Anachronism, 18 
UCLA L. REV. 821, 827 (1971) (criticizing court-martial system’s ability to protect constitutional 
rights); U.S. Military Justice on Trial, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1970, at 18 (“The Uniform Code of 
2
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inadequacies of courts-martial, introduced a number of bills in the early 
1970s that if enacted into law would have, among other things, 
prohibited courts-martial from trying offenses committed in the United 
States except for a small class of purely military crimes.11  The principal 
sponsor of these bills, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, declared in 1971 
that it was “a shameful fact that this nation, which prides itself on 
offering ‘liberty and justice for all,’ fails to provide a first-rate system of 
justice for the very citizens it calls upon to defend those principles.”12  
Indeed, in a 1969 decision, the United States Supreme Court 
characterized courts-martial as meting out “so-called military justice” 
and being “marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive 
justice.”13 
By contrast, misgivings by members of the public and the academic 
community regarding military operations in Iraq have not, for the most 
part, manifested themselves in negative characterizations of the quality 
of justice available at courts-martial.14  If there has been one reasonably 
persistent recent criticism of the military justice system, it has concerned 
who was subjected to trial by court-martial, with commentators 
observing that detainee abuse courts-martial tended to focus on lower-
ranking soldiers and not their military superiors.15  But this criticism is 
in itself remarkable.  Where forty years ago commentators assailed the 
very ability of courts-martial to dispense justice, current complaints have 
focused on the fact that the court-martial net was not cast wider in order 
to prosecute the military superiors of those actually tried by court-
Military Justice is uniform, is a code and is military – and therefore has nothing to do with justice.”) 
(quoting Charles Morgan, Jr. of the American Civil Liberties Union). 
 11. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, American Military Law in the Light of the First Mutiny 
Act’s Tricentennial, 126 MIL. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (1989) (detailing legislative attempts in the early 
1970s to narrow the reach of courts-martial). 
 12. See Kenneth J. Hodgson, The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1972) (quoting a statement by Senator Bayh in a 1971 issue of Parade magazine).  Senator Bayh 
also made a statement in connection with these bills in which he opined that, in addition to problems 
of command influence, the court-martial system “denies a defendant other rights fundamental to a 
free society.”  See 117 CONG. REC. S2551 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1971). 
 13. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 & n.7 (1969); see also id. at 266 (“None of 
the travesties of justice perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, for military law has 
always been and continues to be primarily an instrument of discipline, not justice.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 676 (criticizing “[t]he disparate treatment between 
enlisted soldiers and officers”). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 673-74; Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the 
Gander Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard of Command 
Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 338-41 (2007); Harold H. Koh, Can the 
President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1151 (2006); Christopher A. Britt, Note, 
Commissioning Oath & the Ethical Obligation of Military Officers to Prevent Subordinates from 
Committing Acts of Torture, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 551, 553 & n.25 (2006). 
3
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martial.16  Boiled down, this is an argument that implicitly 
acknowledges the inherent fairness of courts-martial, as the critics have 
urged additional courts-martial rather than seriously challenging the 
merits of the courts-martial actually cond 17
Similarly, where the Supreme Court forty years ago was openly 
dismissive of the truth-seeking abilities of courts-martial, the Court in 
2006 invalidated the President’s military commission regulations based 
in part on its conclusion that Congress required military commissions to 
have the same due process as courts-martial, with the Court identifying 
several areas where the proposed military commissions fell short in that 
regard.18  The Supreme Court’s holding out of courts-martial as the 
exemplar of due process to which military commissions must aspire is 
but the latest step in the rehabilitation of courts-martial as justice-
dispensing entities in the eyes of the Supreme Court.19 
Recent platitudes aside, there are, in this author’s view, serious 
deficiencies in the military justice system that are, for the most part, out 
of the general public’s view.  These deficiencies concern not the conduct 
of courts-martial themselves, but the way that courts-martial are 
reviewed on appeal.20  Simply put, the military appellate courts review 
too many cases because the system inadequately separates cases that 
involve litigable appellate issues from cases that do not.21  In particular, 
the military justice system requires full-blown appellate review in 
virtually all courts-martial in which the approved sentence exceeds a 
relatively modest threshold, even in cases where the accused pleads 
guilty and receives exactly the sentence he requests.22  Remarkably, this 
appellate review system allows – indeed, encourages – accuseds 
pleading guilty as part of a plea bargain to turn around on appeal and 
argue that their convictions should be overturned.23 
No civilian criminal justice system would tolerate appellate review 
in the circumstances in which the military regularly permits court-
martial appeals.24  As a result of this flawed process, court-martial 
 16. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 15, at 676. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786-93 (2006). 
 19. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s evolving perception of courts-martial, see John F. 
O’Connor, Statistics and Military Deference: A Response to Professor Lichtman, 66 MD. L. REV. 
668, 692-94 (2007). 
 20. See infra Part III.D. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006). 
 23. See infra Part III.D. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
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proceedings actually have less finality than the typical civilian criminal 
proceeding, when the government’s interest in achieving finality is 
considerably greater in the military justice context.25 
But the cost of a bloated military appellate review system is not just 
the abstract loss of finality; there are considerable opportunity costs 
imposed by this process.  With such a broad class of cases subject to 
mandatory appellate review, it is hardly surprising that the appellate 
review pipeline is chock full of relatively simple guilty plea cases that 
present no colorable appellate issues whatsoever.26  Every hour that is 
spent in processing these guilty-plea appeals is an hour that is diverted 
from the appellate review of courts-martial involving issues that were 
highly contested at trial.  This one-size-fits-all aspect of appellate review 
diverts resources not only from highly contested courts-martial 
presenting real appellate issues, but also forces the services to devote 
resources to the military appellate system that, if there were a more 
slimmed-down appellate caseload, could be used for other military 
imperatives. 
The crushing caseload caused by the mandatory appellate review of 
guilty-plea cases necessarily creates delays at every level of appellate 
review.27  It is hardly surprising, then, that the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”) – the civilian court sitting atop 
the military justice appellate structure – has encountered a number of 
cases involving post-trial and appellate delays of embarrassing 
durations.28  The only durable solutions to this problem appear to be 
either throwing additional resources at the problem at every stage 
without changing the system itself, or taking a hard look at the military 
appellate caseload with an eye toward reducing the number of cases 
reviewed on appeal.29  Any such effort to narrow the class of courts-
martial subject to mandatory appellate review should focus on 
eliminating appeals where the accused has no moral right to appellate 
review – such as where the accused essentially raised no appealable 
issues at trial – while not being so overly broad as to capture cases where 
an accused may have legitimate issues to raise on appeal.30 
The thesis of this Article is that most of the vices infesting the 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. See infra Part III.D. 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 137 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (“While appellate 
defense counsel’s caseload is the underlying cause of much of this period of delay . . . .”). 
 28. See infra Part III.E. 
 29. See infra Part IV. 
 30. Id. 
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military appellate system could be corrected, or at least moderated, by 
reforming the rules governing when, and how, a servicemember can 
waive his right to appellate review.  Under the system as it currently 
exists, an accused is prohibited from agreeing to waive appellate review 
of his court-martial as part of the plea bargaining process.31  This 
process ensures that an accused can waive his appellate review rights 
only when there is no way for him to get anything in return.  Not 
surprisingly, then, appellate review waivers are
If an accused were permitted to waive his appellate rights as part of 
the plea bargaining process, however, he could actually obtain 
something – sentencing relief – for saving the government the burden of 
appellate review.32  Where the accused has pleaded not guilty at trial, or 
pleads guilty without the benefit of a plea bargain, the accused’s 
appellate review rights would be completely unaffected.33  The proposed 
reform, then, likely would reduce the overall appellate caseload 
considerably, but would not eliminate the appellate review rights of 
accuseds who truly value those rights.34  The result would be a more 
coherent appellate process that eliminates many of the deficiencies 
associated with the current system. 
Part II of this Article examines the “costs” associated with the 
appeal of a court-martial conviction, that is, the resources that are 
required to bring a case through its appellate review.35  When a court-
martial appeal presents colorable issues that the accused has a moral 
right to raise (not having waived them at trial), these are “costs” that are 
well worth expending.36  But where an appeal presents no colorable 
issues, or where the accused by his conduct has waived any legitimate 
right to pursue his arguments on appeal, these costs become an 
unnecessary and unwise burden to impose on the military justice 
system.37 
Part III of this Article explores the arguments in favor of reforming 
the military appellate review framework.  An analysis of the military 
appellate review system demonstrates that it disserves the military’s 
interest in finality of criminal proceedings, and gives accuseds perverse 
incentives to take inconsistent positions at trial and on appeal, something 
 31. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RULES FOR COURTS MARTIAL 705(b), 
(c) (2005) [hereinafter R.C.M.]. 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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that never would be permitted in the civilian context.38  Most 
troublesome, the military appellate review system fails to differentiate 
between cases that present substantial issues raised and preserved at trial 
and the fairly common case where the accused pleads guilty and raises 
no issues whatsoever at trial.39  By subjecting both types of cases to the 
same appellate review, the military appellate system harms accuseds 
seeking to raise contested issues on appeal because their appeals are 
delayed while largely frivolous cases wind their way ahead of them in 
the appellate pipeline.40 
Part IV of this Article examines potential ways to address the 
inefficiencies of the military appellate system.41  Ultimately, the most 
effective reform is one that is market based, that essentially allows 
accuseds to self-select as to whether they will pursue an appeal of their 
court-martial.42  Rule for Court-Martial 705(c)43 prohibits accuseds from 
dealing away their appellate rights in the plea bargaining process.  
Changing that rule would help separate the appellate wheat from the 
chaff, as accuseds who have no colorable issues to raise at trial would be 
highly likely to waive appellate review as part of a plea bargain.44  Such 
a trend would free up appellate resources to deal with substantial 
appellate issues raised by accuseds who actually contested matters at 
trial, while taking appellate rights away from only those accuseds who 
value the benefits of a plea agreement over their right to pursue an 
appeal.45 
II.  THE “COSTS” OF A COURT-MARTIAL APPEAL 
Article 66(a) of the UCMJ requires that the Judge Advocate 
General of each service establish a Court of Criminal Appeals to hear 
court-martial appeals.46  In the absence of waiver, these courts review all 
courts-martial where the approved sentence includes death, a punitive 
discharge, or confinement for one year or more.47  In Fiscal Year 2005, 
the service Judge Advocates General received records of trial for 3,364 
courts-martial that were subject to mandatory appellate review under 
 38. See infra Part III.A. 
 39. See infra Part III.D. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See infra Part IV. 
 42. Id. 
 43. R.C.M. 705(c), supra note 31. 
 44. See infra Part IV. 
 45. Id. 
 46. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(a), art. 66(a) (2006). 
 47. Id. § 866(b), art. 66(b). 
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Article 66.48  For every one of these courts-martial, there are significant 
resources expended in completing this mandatory appellate review. 
Once the military judge bangs her gavel to conclude a court-
martial, the appellate review process essentially begins.  Where the 
adjudged sentence, if approved, would trigger mandatory appellate 
review, the court reporter must prepare a verbatim transcript of the 
proceedings.49  Once completed, the record of trial is delivered to the 
prosecutor, called the trial counsel, who reviews the record of trial to 
“ensure that the reporter makes a true, complete and accurate record of 
the proceedings.”50  If no unreasonable delay will result, the trial counsel 
also provides a copy of the record of trial to the accused’s defense 
counsel, before authentication, so that the defense counsel can examine 
the record of trial and propose any additional corrections.51  Once the 
record of trial has been reviewed by the trial counsel, and any 
appropriate corrections are made, the record of trial is delivered to the 
military judge who presided over the court-martial for review and 
authentication.52 
Once the military judge authenticates the record of trial, a copy is 
served on the accused or his defense counsel.53  The authenticated record 
of trial also is provided to the convening authority, the military 
commander who referred the charges to court-martial, who has the 
power to approve or disapprove of the findings or sentence of the court-
martial.54  However, there are a number of procedural steps that must 
take place before the convening authority is permitted to take action on a 
record of trial.55 
First, once the accused (or his counsel) has been served with the 
 48. See Annual Report of the Code Committee on Military Justice, Fiscal Year 2005, § 3 at 
app. 1 (noting that the Army had 954 records of trial processed for Article 66 review); § 4 at app. 1 
(noting that the Navy and Marine Corps had a total of 1,835 records of trial processed for Article 66 
review); § 5 at app. 1 (noting that the Air Force had 543 records of trial processed for Article 66 
review); § 6 at app. 1 (noting that the Coast Guard had 32 records of trial processed for Article 66 
review), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/Annual.htm. 
 49. R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(B) (setting forth instances in which a verbatim transcript must be 
prepared for general courts-martial); R.C.M. 1103(c) (setting forth circumstances in which a 
verbatim transcript is required for special courts-martial).  Where an accused has been convicted, 
but a verbatim transcript is not required, the court reporter may prepare a “summarized report of the 
proceedings” for inclusion in the record of trial.  R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(C). 
 50. Discussion, R.C.M. 1103(i)(1)(A). 
 51. R.C.M. 1103(i)(1)(B). 
 52. R.C.M. 1104(a)(2)(A).  If the military judge is unavailable to authenticate the record of 
trial, R.C.M. 1104(a)(2)(B) provides for alternative means of authenticating the record of trial. 
 53. R.C.M. 1104(b)(1)(A), (C). 
 54. R.C.M. 1106(a). 
 55. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. 
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authenticated record of trial, the accused has ten days in which to submit 
matters for the convening authority to consider.56  In this submission, the 
accused can argue that errors committed at the court-martial affect the 
legality of the findings or sentence, can submit materials in mitigation 
that were not available at the time of the court-martial, and can provide 
materials in support of a request that the convening authority reduce the 
severity of the adjudged sentence as a matter of clemency.57  The ten-
day deadline for submission of such matters by the defense may be 
extended by the convening authority or his staff judge adv 58
Once the accused has submitted post-trial materials for 
consideration by the convening authority, or the deadline for submitting 
such materials has passed, the record of trial and any submitted post-trial 
materials are routed to the convening authority’s staff judge advocate or 
legal officer for review.59  The staff judge advocate or legal officer is 
required to submit a report to the convening authority to assist the 
convening authority in taking action on the adjudged sentence.60  This 
report has a number of mandatory issues to be addressed, and must 
include a specific recommendation as to the action to be taken by the 
convening authority with respect to the adjudged sentence.61  If the 
accused’s post-trial submission alleges legal error during the court-
martial proceedings, a staff judge advocate’s report also must address 
whether corrective action should be taken.62  In addition to the required 
subjects, a staff judge advocate’s recommendation can include other 
materials deemed appropriate by the staff judge advocate or legal 
officer, including material from outside the court-martial record.63 
Before the record of trial can be forwarded to the convening 
authority for action, however, the report and recommendation of the staff 
judge advocate or legal officer must be served on the accused and his 
defense counsel.64  The accused’s counsel is permitted ten days from 
service of the staff judge advocate or legal officer recommendation to 
 56. R.C.M. 1105(c)(1). 
 57. R.C.M. 1105(b). 
 58. R.C.M. 1105(c)(1). 
 59. R.C.M. 1106(a). 
 60. R.C.M. 1106(d)(1). 
 61. R.C.M. 1106(d)(3). 
 62. R.C.M. 1106(d)(4). 
 63. R.C.M. 1106(d)(5). 
 64. R.C.M. 1106(f)(1).  The accused also can elect to have the report and recommendation 
served solely on defense counsel, and the staff judge advocate or legal officer can serve the report 
and recommendation solely on defense counsel, even over the accused’s objection, where it is 
impractical to serve the accused.  Id. 
9
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submit comments on the recommendation.65  Once all of these 
procedures have been accomplished, the record of trial is forwarded to 
the convening authority.66  In taking action on the record of trial, the 
convening authority is required to take action on the sentence, and is 
permitted to take action on the findings.67  The convening authority may 
approve the findings as adjudged at trial, or he may change a finding of 
guilty to a finding of guilty to a lesser included offense, or the convening 
authority can set aside one or more findings of guilty and either dismiss 
the charges or order a rehearing on them.68  As for the adjudged 
sentence, the convening authority can approve the sentence as adjudged, 
or can disapprove the adjudged sentence in whole or in part, or change 
the punishment adjudged so long as the change does not increase the 
severity of the accused’s punishment.69 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the process of readying a 
record of trial for a convening authority’s action is a labor-intensive one, 
but it is just the first step in the appellate review process.  Nevertheless, 
the convening authority’s action is an important line of demarcation, 
particularly as it relates to an accused’s right to waive appellate review 
of his court-martial conviction.70  The accused’s deadline for filing a 
waiver of appellate review is ten days after the accused or his counsel is 
served with the convening authority’s action.71  Importantly, however, 
the rules for courts-martial are structured to ensure that an accused can 
never obtain anything of value for waiving his right to appellate review 
of his court-martial conviction.72 
 65. R.C.M. 1106(f)(5).  The staff judge advocate or legal officer may supplement his 
recommendation to address the comments submitted by the accused’s defense counsel.  R.C.M. 
1106(f)(7).  However, if this addendum contains new matter, it must be served on defense counsel 
and defense counsel must be provided ten days to comment on the new matter before the record of 
trial is forwarded to the convening authority for action.  Id. 
 66. R.C.M. 1107. 
 67. Id. 
 68. R.C.M. 1107(c). 
 69. R.C.M. 1107(d).  A number of cases have considered whether the convening authority’s 
change in the sentence from one type of punishment to another had the effect of increasing the 
accused’s punishment.  Paradoxically, these cases typically arise when the change in punishment by 
the convening authority came at the specific request of the accused, such as where the accused asks 
the convening authority to increase the period of any confinement in return for not approving a 
punitive discharge from the service.  See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 45 M.J. 168, 170 (C.A.A.F. 
1996); United States v. Lee, 43 M.J. 794, 799 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995). 
 70. See R.C.M. 1107(c). 
 71. R.C.M. 1110(a), (f)(1).  After the deadline for waiving appellate review has passed, an 
accused may withdraw appellate review by filing a notice of withdrawal either with the service 
Judge Advocate General or with the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the 
accused.  R.C.M. 1110(e)(2). 
 72. See United States v. Baker, 28 M.J. 121, 122 (C.M.A. 1989). 
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First, R.C.M. 705(c) prohibits pretrial agreements (the military term 
for a plea bargain) from including any provision that would deprive the 
accused of “the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and 
appellate rights.”73  Second, the rule concerning waiver of appellate 
rights expressly provides that “[n]o person may compel, coerce, or 
induce an accused by force, promises of clemency, or otherwise to waive 
or withdraw appellate review.”74  Given that the rules require an 
affirmative act by an accused to waive his right to appellate review, and 
yet prohibit an accused from receiving any consideration for executing 
such a waiver, it is hardly surprising that waivers of appellate review are 
exceedingly rare.75 
Excepting the rare case where an accused magnanimously waives 
his appellate rights, the convening authority, upon approving a sentence 
including a punitive discharge or confinement for one year or longer, 
sends the record of trial to the appropriate service Judge Advocate 
General.76  The Judge Advocate General then forwards the record to the 
Court of Criminal Appeals for the first level of appellate review under 
Article 66 of the UCMJ.77  Each service is required under the UCMJ to 
appoint appellate defense counsel to represent accuseds, at government 
expense, in their appeals to the applicable Court of Criminal Appeals.78 
Thus, in every case involving Article 66 appellate review, a 
government-funded appellate defense counsel reviews the record of trial 
in order to determine what errors, if any, can be asserted in the Court of 
Criminal Appeals.79  In performing that task, “[a]ppellate defense 
counsel has the obligation to assign all arguable issues,” as well as to 
identify issues that the accused asks counsel to raise even if counsel 
believes that the issues raised by the accused are frivolous.80  If appellate 
defense counsel identifies issues worthy of an assignment of error, or if 
the accused raises assignments of error that appellate defense counsel 
believes are frivolous, appellate defense counsel files a brief before the 
proper Court of Criminal Appeals, and appellate government counsel is 
 73. R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B). 
 74. R.C.M. 1109(c). 
 75. See Baker, 28 M.J. at 122. 
 76. R.C.M. 1111(a)(1), (b)(1) (requiring that general court-martial records of trial and special 
court-martial records of trial be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General provided that the accused 
has not waived appellate review). 
 77. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006) (requiring the service Judge Advocates 
General to forward to a Court of Criminal Appeals all records of trial where the approved sentence 
includes death, a punitive discharge, or confinement for one year); R.C.M. 1201(a) (same). 
 78. Id. § 870(a), (c), art. 70(a), (c) (2006); R.C.M. 1202(a), (b)(2). 
 79. See id. 
 80. United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431, 435-36 (C.M.A. 1982). 
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assigned to review the brief and record of trial in order to formulate the 
government’s response.81 
Moreover, even where the accused and his appellate defense 
counsel submit no allegations of error, the Courts of Criminal Appeals 
still must review the entire record of trial independently in order to 
satisfy itself that the findings and sentence are correct as a matter of law 
and fact.82  When appellate defense counsel and the accused identify no 
issues to raise on appeal, rather than having the case end there, appellate 
defense counsel submits the record of trial to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals “on the merits.”83  A submission on the merits is a pleading 
filed “without conceding the legal or factual correctness of the findings 
of guilty or the sentence . . . [but] which does not assign error.”84  As the 
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals explains in its rules: 
In cases referred to the Court for review pursuant to Article 66, 
U.C.M.J., the appellant, without conceding the legal or factual 
correctness of the findings of guilty or the sentence, may file a 
pleading which does not assign error, does not raise error asserted 
personally by the appellant, and does not request specific relief.  In 
such cases, the Clerk will deliver the original record of trial to the 
Court without delay.  The Court may proceed with its review and may 
issue a decision unless notified within seven days that the appellee 
intends to file a brief . . . .85 
 81. Id.; see also § 870(b), art. 70(b) (detailing duties of appellate government counsel); 
United States v. McNally, No. ACM 28963, 1991 WL 82142, at *1 (A.F.C.M.R. Mar. 14, 1991) 
(noting that appellate government counsel typically is not provided a record of trial for review until 
such time as error has been assigned). 
 82. § 866(c), art. 66(c); see also Grostefon, 12 M.J. at 435 (observing that the service Courts 
of Criminal Appeals, then known as the Courts of Military Review, have “the mandatory 
responsibility to read the entire record and independently arrive at a decision that the findings and 
sentence are correct in law and fact”).  Indeed, the Courts of Criminal Appeals are unique among 
appellate courts in that they have de novo fact finding powers.  § 866(c), art. 66(c) (“In considering 
the record, [the Court of Criminal Appeals] may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of 
witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and 
heard the witnesses.”); United States v. Tyler, 34 M.J. 293, 295 (C.M.A. 1992) (commenting on the 
“unique fact finding power(s)” of the Courts of Criminal Appeals). 
 83. See United States v. Pritchett, No. NMCCA 9601212, 2005 WL 1656838, at *2 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. July 14, 2005) (“[E]ach lawyer who enters an appearance has a duty to read the record 
and file a brief or submission on the merits in a timely manner.”). 
 84. United States v. Adams, 59 M.J. 367, 369 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (omission in original); see also 
United States v. Riggs, 59 M.J. 614, 615 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (characterizing a merits 
submission as a pleading that “while not acknowledging that the findings and sentence are correct in 
law and fact, has assigned no error”). 
 85. A. CT. CRIM. APP. R.15.2, available at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/acca.  The Air Force 
and Navy-Marine Corps Courts of Criminal Appeals similarly have internal rules acknowledging 
the existence of briefs “on the merits,” where the accused and his appellate defense counsel assign 
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A submission “on the merits” therefore simply sends the record of 
trial to the Court of Criminal Appeals and requires that court to review 
the entire record in order to render its independent judgment as to 
whether there are any errors that could affect the legal and factual 
correctness of the approved findings and sentence, even where the 
accused and his appellate counsel have alleged no errors.86  In 
conducting this independent review of submissions “on the merits,” the 
Courts of Criminal Appeals can take any number of actions, from 
approving the court-martial findings and sentence, to taking corrective 
action with respect to errors that it identifies, to addressing potential 
legal issues and explaining why they require no corrective action, to 
specifying issues to be briefed by appellate defense counsel and 
appellate government counsel for further consideration by the court.87 
Once the Court of Criminal Appeals has issued its decision, an 
accused, through his assigned appellate defense counsel, can file a 
petition in the CAAF, asking that court to review the decision of the 
Court of Criminal Appeals.88  In cases in which CAAF grants review, 
the accused can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court to the extent that the accused is aggrieved by the 
CAAF’s decision.89  As with petitions for review filed with CAAF, an 
no errors to the proceedings below and the court proceeds with its independent review of the record.  
See A.F. CT. CRIM. APP. R.15.4, available at https://afcca.law.af.mil/content/afcca_data 
/cp/afccacombinedrules-05mar07.pdf  (“Cases in which appellate defense counsel do not assign and 
the Court does not specify any issues, will be designated ‘merits’ cases.  Appellate government 
counsel need not respond to a case submitted on its merits.”); N-M. Ct. Crim. App. R.4-1(b), 
available at http://www/jag.navy.mil/documents/NMCCARules RulesPandP.doc (adopting different 
filing procedures for appellate briefs assigning error and “merit submissions”). 
 86. See Adams, 59 M.J. at 369. 
 87. For a sampling of cases in which a Court of Criminal Appeals raised an issue on an appeal 
submitted “on the merits,” see, e.g., United States v. Peele, 46 M.J. 866, 867 n.1 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 
1997); United States v. Reynolds, 44 M.J. 726, 727 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1996); United States v. 
Smith, 41 M.J. 817, 818 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995); United States v. Sanchez, 40 M.J. 508, 509 
(A.C.M.R. 1994); United States v. Vandivel, 37 M.J. 854, 856 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993); United States v. 
Simms, 35 M.J. 902, 903 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Wallace, 35 M.J. 897, 898 (A.C.M.R. 
1992); United States v. Washington, 35 M.J. 774, 775 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Story, 35 
M.J. 677, 677 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Bouknight, 35 M.J. 671, 672 (A.C.M.R. 1992); 
United States v. Coleman, 34 M.J. 1020, 1021 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Gowadia, 34 M.J. 
714, 716 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Simpson, 33 M.J. 1063, 1064 (A.C.M.R. 1991); United 
States v. Goodes, 33 M.J. 888, 888 (C.G.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Brookins, 33 M.J. 793, 794 
(A.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Tenk, 33 M.J. 765, 766 (A.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. 
McCaig, 32 M.J. 751, 752 (A.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Morales-Santana, 32 M.J. 557, 557 
(A.C.M.R. 1990); United States v. Shaw, 30 M.J. 1033, 1033 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990). 
 88. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 867(b), art. 67(b) (2006) (conferring upon the CAAF discretionary 
jurisdiction over decisions by the Courts of Criminal Appeals); § 870(c), art. 70(c) (providing that 
appellate defense counsel shall represent an accused before the CAAF upon the accused’s request). 
 89. Id. § 867a(a), art. 67a(a) (2006). 
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accused is entitled to representation by a government-funded appellate 
defense counsel in connection with the filing of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari.90  These are the “costs” that the UCMJ and Rules for Courts-
Martial impose on the military appellate review system for each of the 
thousands of courts-martial each year that result in an approved sentence 
that includes a punitive discharge or confinement for one year or more. 
It must be stressed, however, that the use of the term “costs” to 
describe the required appellate review procedures is not intended in a 
pejorative sense.  The fact that the appellate review process for a given 
court-martial imposes a cost or burden does not necessarily mean that 
these costs are wasteful or unwise.  When an accused is charged with a 
crime and contests guilt at trial, it makes perfect sense to establish 
procedures that allow the accused meaningfully to challenge his 
conviction on appeal.  And the unique characteristics of the court-martial 
forum, with its emphasis on speed and the worldwide reach of its 
jurisdiction, certainly supports the notion that the government should 
bear the financial burden of ensuring that the accused is adequately 
represented on appeal.91 
But every case is not A Few Good Men or The Caine Mutiny, where 
the accused vigorously contests the charges against him and rightfully 
should expect an appellate review apparatus that will allow him to 
pursue vindication on appeal.  Rather, many courts-martial, if not most, 
involve no contested charges, have an accused who has agreed to plead 
guilty to some or all of the charges in return for sentencing relief, have 
no pretrial motions filed or ruled upon, and, in many cases, involve a 
situation where the accused has expressly asked the military judge to 
sentence him to a punitive discharge from the service.92  The military 
justice system’s one-size-fits-all appellate review system, which requires 
the same procedural steps for an essentially uncontested guilty plea case 
as it does for a full-blown trial on the merits, does a disservice to the 
accused who actually litigated issues below because it diverts resources 
to guilty plea cases with no contested issues that could be expended in 
dealing with appeals from contested courts-martial.93  At a bare 
 90. Id. § 870, art. 70.  Indeed, the CAAF recently issued an order directing an accused’s 
appellate defense counsel to continue representation of the accused where the deadline for filing a 
certiorari petition had not expired.  Order, Lovett v. United States, No. 07-8002/AF, Daily Journal 
No. 07-015 (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/journal/ 
2006Jrnl/2006Oct.htm. 
 91. See Smith, supra note 2, at 674 (“One of the advantages of the military justice system is 
its ability to respond quickly to acts of misconduct.”). 
 92. See infra Part III.D. 
 93. Id. 
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minimum, the seeming illogic in treating contested courts-martial the 
same as uncontested guilty plea cases for appellate review purposes 
justifies an examination of the credits and debits of continuing full-
blown appellate review of virtually all courts-martial reaching the 
punishment threshold set forth in Article 66(b) of the UCMJ.94 
III.  THE CASE FOR ENDING REGULARIZED APPELLATE REVIEW OF 
GUILTY PLEA CASES 
A.  Comparing Civilian and Military Practice 
The military justice system, as presently constructed, essentially 
requires the same appellate review for each and every court-martial 
where the approved sentence includes a punitive discharge or 
confinement for one year or more.95  Indeed, the only cases meeting the 
Article 66(b) punishment threshold that are not subject to full-blown 
appellate review are cases in which the accused takes the affirmative 
step (for no consideration) of waiving or withdrawing appellate 
review.96  The extent of appellate review does not depend on whether 
the accused pleaded guilty at trial, whether he had a pretrial agreement 
to plead guilty, or even whether the accused raised a single motion or 
objection at trial.97  In conducting a ground-up assessment of the utility 
of that program, a useful starting point is consideration of the appellate 
review process in the civilian federal court sy
One reason why a review of civilian practice is a sensible starting 
point is Article 36(a) of the UCMJ, which permits the President to 
promulgate court-martial rules subject to the following guidance: 
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures . . . may be prescribed by the 
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, 
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally 
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this 
chapter.98 
While Article 36(a) appears to evince a legislative preference that 
court-martial procedures conform to civilian practice where practicable, 
 94. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006). 
 95. Id. § 866(b), art. 66(b). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. § 836(a), art. 36(a). 
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this is hardly an inexorable command.99  In enacting the UCMJ, 
Congress expressly created an appellate review system where the 
standards for appellate review would differ from the standards in federal 
court.100  Therefore, one properly can surmise that, at least as of the time 
of the enactment of the UCMJ, Congress itself had concluded that 
appellate review norms for courts-martial and for civilian courts need 
not be congruent.  Moreover, even where the UCMJ is silent on an issue 
of procedure, its only command is that the President apply federal court 
principles only so far as he determines that such principles are 
practicable for court-martial practice.101 
Nevertheless, consideration of civilian practice is a crucial starting 
point in assessing existing court-martial appellate procedures because 
civilian practice sheds considerable light on the value judgments 
American society has made as to the appropriate appellate structure for a 
respectable criminal justice system.  Given society’s policy choices with 
respect to the civilian criminal justice system, it is appropriate to 
question why additional appellate review standards are required in the 
military justice system than are deemed essential in the civilian context.  
Of course, the fact that the military justice system might have additional 
procedures in one aspect or another of appellate review does not per se 
make those procedures inappropriate or excessive, but it does signal an 
appropriate place to stop and at least consider whether the advantages of 
those additional procedures justify the costs that they impose on the 
system. 
There are four distinctions between the military and federal court 
criminal justice systems that, when applied together, create a remarkable 
difference in the appellate review procedures in each forum.102  The first 
such distinction is that the military justice system creates mandatory 
appellate review when the approved sentence reaches a relatively low 
threshold,103 while there is no mandatory appellate review in the federal 
court system.  Rather, in federal court, a criminal defendant can appeal 
his conviction and sentence only if he takes the affirmative step of 
 99. See id. 
 100. Compare U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006) (requiring, except where the 
accused waived appellate review, referral to a Court of Criminal Appeals of all courts-martial where 
the adjudged sentence includes a punitive discharge or confinement for one year) and § 866(c), art. 
66(c) (requiring a Court of Criminal Appeals to review the record of trial of every court-martial 
referred to it) with FED. R. APP. P. 3(A) (providing that an appeal of right is taken only by filing a 
notice of appeal in the federal district court within the time required). 
 101. Id. § 836(a), art. 36(a). 
 102. See infra notes 103-125 and accompanying text. 
 103. § 866(b), art. 66(b). 
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timely filing a notice of appeal.104  Thus, in civilian practice, inertia 
leads to no appeal, while in the military justice system, inertia leads to 
automatic appellate review. 
The second distinction between the two systems of justice concerns 
the accused’s ability to waive appellate review of his case.  In federal 
civilian practice, an accused is permitted to waive appellate review as 
part of his plea bargain with the government, and therefore can use his 
appellate rights as a bargaining chip in plea discussions.105  By contrast, 
while a military accused, except one facing an approved death sentence, 
has the power to waive appellate review, the court-martial rules 
promulgated by the President prohibit the accused from trading away his 
appellate rights as part of plea negotiations106 and prohibit the 
government from offering the accused any inducement at all, such as 
 104. See FED. R. APP. P. 3 (requiring the timely filing of a notice of appeal to create appellate 
court jurisdiction). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Speaks, No. 05-4091, 2006 WL 3827002, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 
28, 2006) (“In paragraph 5 of his plea agreement, Speaks waived his right to appeal ‘the conviction 
and whatever sentence is imposed.’  A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is 
knowing and intelligent.”); United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Since 
Wiggins, [905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990)], we have consistently adhered to the principle that 
sentencing appeal waivers generally are enforceable and we have enforced such waivers in a 
number of cases.”); United States v. Cohen, 459 F.3d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Generally 
speaking, we will uphold a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights if the waiver is valid and the issue 
sought to be appealed falls within the scope of the waiver.”); United States v. Hernandez, 170 F. 
App’x 606, 607 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Hernandez’s sentence appeal waiver is valid and enforceable, 
and it precludes from appellate review any potential sentencing issues . . . .”); United States v. 
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[W]e generally enforce plea agreements 
and their concomitant waivers of appellate rights.”); United States v. Joseph, 38 F. App’x 985, 986 
(4th Cir. 2002) (“A waiver of appeal provision in a valid plea agreement is enforceable if it resulted 
from a knowing and intelligent decision to forgo an appeal.”); United States v. Anderson, 28 F. 
App’x 795, 797 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The United States correctly argues that defendant waived his 
statutory right to appeal by knowingly and voluntarily waiving that right in his plea agreement.”); 
United States v. Gamboa-Felix, 18 F. App’x 204, 208 (4th Cir. 2001) (“We have consistently held 
that, with a few exceptions, a defendant may not appeal his sentence if his plea agreement contains 
an express and unqualified waiver of the right to appeal, unless that waiver was unknowing or 
involuntary.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 
113 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is by now well established that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right 
to appeal is generally enforceable.”); United States v. Aponte-Rodriguez, 7 F. App’x 715, 715 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“There is no dispute that Aponte-Rodriguez agreed to waive appellate review in 
exchange for a reduced sentence.  Such waivers are effective even when the defendant seeks to 
appeal a sentence imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines . . . .” 
(citations and internal quotations omitted) (omission in original)); United States v. Buchanan, 59 
F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant may waive the statutory right to appeal his sentence. . . 
.  We look to circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement to determine 
whether the defendant agreed to its terms knowingly and voluntarily.” (citations omitted)). 
 106. See R.C.M. 705(c) (“A term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall not be enforced if it 
deprives the accused of . . . the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate rights.”). 
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sentencing relief, in return for a waiver of appellate review.107  As a 
result of these different rules, military accuseds almost never waive their 
appellate rights while civilian accuseds frequently bargain those rights 
away in plea negotiations.108  Indeed, appellate review waivers are so 
ingrained into civilian practice that the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure specifically provide that, as part of its plea colloquy, the 
district court “must inform the defendant of, and determine that the 
defendant understands . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision 
waiving the right to appeal.”109 
A third important difference between the federal criminal justice 
system and the military justice system is that even when civilian 
criminal defendants do not expressly waive appellate review as part of a 
plea agreement, they generally forfeit the right to challenge a finding of 
guilt on appeal by pleading guilty to the charge in federal district 
court.110  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) limits the federal 
court of appeals’ review of trial court errors not raised below to “plain 
errors or errors affecting substantial rights.”111  In explaining how the 
rule serves to limit a criminal defendant’s power to raise issues on 
appeal that were not raised at trial, the Supreme Court made the almost-
too-obvious point that a defendant may not plead guilty at trial and then 
challenge the fact that he was convicted of the offense on appeal: 
The first limitation on appellate authority under Rule 52(b) is that there 
indeed be an “error.”  Deviation from a legal rule is “error” unless the 
rule has been waived.  For example, a defendant who knowingly and 
voluntarily pleads guilty in conformity with the requirements of Rule 
11 cannot have his conviction vacated by court of appeals on the 
grounds that he ought to have had a trial.  Because the right to trial is 
waivable, and because the defendant who enters a valid guilty plea 
waives that right, his conviction without trial is not “error.”112 
 107. See R.C.M. 1110(c) (“No person may compel, coerce, or induce an accused by force, 
promises of clemency, or otherwise to waive or withdraw appellate review.”). 
 108. See supra note 105 (collecting representative federal court cases in which the defendant 
waived his appellate rights as part of the plea-bargaining process). 
 109. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). 
 110. See Fed. R. Crim P. 52(b). 
 111. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 112. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993).  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11 sets forth the inquiry required of a federal district judge in order to ensure that the defendant is 
pleading guilty to an offense knowingly and voluntarily.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.  See also Kercheval v. 
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (“A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere 
admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction.  Like a verdict of a jury it is 
conclusive.  More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”). 
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Thus, a plea of guilty “is more than an admission of past conduct; it 
is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be entered 
without a trial – a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge.”113 
As a result, under the federal criminal system, a defendant who 
knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty waives his right to challenge his 
conviction on appeal.114 
By contrast, the military accused who pleads guilty – even if he 
pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement – does not waive the right to 
challenge his conviction on appeal, and he need not even thread the 
needle of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in order to seek 
reversal of his conviction on appeal.115  Under the military justice 
system, a military judge considering an accused’s guilty plea must not 
only ensure that the accused’s plea is knowing and voluntary, but also 
must engage in a colloquy with the accused – called a providence 
inquiry – in which the accused admits the facts that cause him to believe 
 113. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 242 (1969) (“A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did 
various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine 
punishment.”). 
 114. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733; see also, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975) 
(“[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and 
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case . . . .”); United States v. 
Castillo, 464 F.3d 988, 990 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vasquez, 29 F. App’x 876, 877 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“As a general rule, an entry of a plea of guilty waives appellate review unless the court 
lacked jurisdiction, the plea was invalid, or the sentence was illegal.”).  While a civilian convicted 
pursuant to a guilty plea can maintain a habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the standard is exceedingly high.  “A guilty plea, voluntarily and intelligently entered, may 
not be vacated because the defendant was not advised of every conceivable constitutional plea in 
abatement he might have to the charge, no matter how peripheral such a plea might be to the normal 
focus of counsel’s inquiry.”  Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  Rather, a habeas 
petitioner who pleaded guilty at trial “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the 
guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards [of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.]”  Id. (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).  In pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas petitioner 
who pleaded guilty must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  Such a habeas petitioner is further burdened by the fact that his plea of guilty 
waives his right to assert “independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that 
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”  Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; see also New York v. Hill, 
528 U.S. 110, 117 (2000) (“We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal 
defendants that also serve broader social interests.”); United States v. Mezzanotto, 513 U.S. 196, 
201 (1995) (“A criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most 
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.”) (collecting cases); Peretz v. United States, 
501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“The most basic rights of criminal defendants are similarly subject to 
waiver.”). 
 115. See R.C.M. 910(e). 
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he is guilty of the offense charged.116  The CAAF has explained the 
difference between civilian and military plea inquiries as follows: 
The record of trial when a guilty plea is entered in a court-martial 
generally is more detailed than the record made in a similar proceeding 
in federal civilian criminal court.  When an accused proffers a guilty 
plea in a court-martial, the military judge is bound to establish on the 
record that there is a factual basis for the plea.  [T]he accuse[d] must 
be convinced of, and be able to describe all the facts necessary to 
establish guilt.  Indeed, at any time prior to sentencing, if an accused 
makes a statement to the court-martial, in testimony or otherwise, or 
presents evidence which is inconsistent with a plea of guilty on which 
a finding is based, the military judge shall inquire into the providence 
of the plea.  If the military judge is unable to resolve this apparent 
inconsistency, he is obliged as a matter of law to set aside the guilty 
plea and enter a plea of not guilty.117 
The requirement of a providence inquiry stands in stark contrast to 
civilian criminal practice, which requires no such inquiry118 and which 
also permits a civilian criminal defendant to enter an Alford plea, in 
which the defendant pleads guilty without even admitting his guilt.119 
The requirement of a providence inquiry under the military justice 
system has significant implications for the court-martial appellate 
system.  While the federal system treats a guilty plea as waiving the 
 116. R.C.M. 910(e) (“The military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without making such 
inquiry of the accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a factual basis for the plea.  The 
accused shall be questioned under oath about the offenses.”). 
 117. United States v. Lloyd, 46 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted) (alteration in original). 
 118. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (setting forth required inquiry before a federal district judge may 
accept a guilty plea). 
 119. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An individual accused of crime 
may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence 
even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”).  
Indeed, Robinson O. Everett explained this significant difference between military and civilian 
practice in an article he wrote while serving as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Military 
Appeals: 
Article 45 of the Uniform Code provides that if, after a plea of guilty, the accused sets up 
matter inconsistent with his plea, then a plea of not guilty will be entered.  In a number 
of cases that over the years reached our Court the issue was whether an accused’s 
testimony or other evidence in mitigation and extenuation was inconsistent with his plea.  
In the civil courts, it seems well-established that a guilty plea will be deemed voluntary 
and not improvident even though the defendant testifies during his trial that he was 
innocent of the offense to which he pleads guilty. 
Robinson O. Everett, Some Comments on the Civilianization of Military Justice, ARMY LAW., Sept. 
1980, at 1, 4. 
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defendant’s right to challenge his conviction on appeal,120 this is not the 
case in the military justice system.  The military appellate courts have 
long allowed accuseds who pleaded guilty at trial to argue on appeal that 
their conviction should be overturned because they did not admit facts in 
their providence inquiry to satisfy all of the elements of the offense, or 
because evidence adduced at some point in the court-martial was 
inconsistent with the accused’s plea of guilty.121  While the standard for 
overturning a conviction based on an inadequate providence inquiry is 
relatively high – requiring “a substantial conflict between the plea and 
the accused’s statements or other evidence on the record”122 – appellate 
challenges to the providence of a guilty plea are common in the military 
justice system and tax the resources of the military appellate courts and 
appellate counsel in briefing and resolving such challenges.123 
Finally, not only does the military justice system create a 
mandatory appeal of courts-martial surpassing a relatively low 
sentencing threshold, but the military appellate courts are also required 
to conduct independent review of the record of trial to determine 
 120. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text. 
 121. See United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991) (discussing availability of 
appellate challenge to sufficiency of the providence inquiry conducted at trial). 
 122. United States v. Garcia, 44 M.J. 496, 498 (C.A.A.F. 1996).  “A ‘mere possibility’ of such 
a conflict is not a sufficient basis to overturn the trial results.”  Id. (quoting Prater, 32 M.J. at 436). 
 123. For example, a cursory search of the military justice database on Westlaw for decisions 
between June and December 2006, reveals a multitude of military appellate decisions in which the 
principal issue resolved in the appeal was whether the providence inquiry provided a sufficient basis 
for the military judge to accept the accused’s guilty plea, or whether evidence presented by the 
accused was sufficiently inconsistent with the accused’s plea to have required rejection of the plea.  
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 63 M.J. 223, 225 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Zachary, 63 
M.J. 438, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Phillippe, 63 M.J. 307, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2006); 
United States v. Flores, No. ACM 36218, 2006 WL 3895072, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 
2006); United States v. Lazard, No. ACM 36430, 2006 WL 3085630, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
Oct. 18, 2006); United States v. Chaney, No. ACM 36138, 2006 WL 2843492, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. Sept. 29, 2006); United States v. Firth, 64 M.J. 508, 510 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2006); United 
States v. Wallace, No. ACM 36407, 2006 WL 2548174, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2006); 
United States v. Lewis, No. ACM 36401, 2006 WL 2547404, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 
2006); United States v. Stordahl, No. ACM 36187, 2006 WL 2547873, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
Aug. 22, 2006); United States v. Smith, No. ACM S30806, 2006 WL 2269035, at *1 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. July 20, 2006); United States v. Trott, No. ACM 36077, 2006 WL 2269417, at *3 (A.F. 
Ct. Crim. App. July 18, 2006); United States v. McLaurin, No. ACMS 30371, 2006 WL 1976550, at 
*2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 30, 2006).  These electronically-available decisions do not include the 
slip opinions rejecting providence inquiry challenges that are not selected for inclusion in the 
Westlaw database.  In addition, the Courts of Criminal Appeals, in completing their mandatory 
Article 66(c) review of courts-martial, are required to consider the sufficiency of the accused’s 
providence inquiry even when the accused and his appellate defense counsel have not even asserted 
that the providence inquiry was inadequate.  United States v. Lloyd, 46 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 1997) 
(“The Courts of Criminal Appeals must also consider the providence inquiry to ensure that findings 
are correct in law and fact under Article 66(c).”). 
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whether any issues should be addressed that were not even raised by the 
accused and his appellate defense counsel.124  By contrast, the federal 
courts of appeals are not required to consider appellate issues not raised 
by the parties, and regularly hold that a defendant has forfeited a claim 
of error by not raising it in his papers.125 
As the foregoing discussions demonstrates, virtually every 
convention in the civilian criminal justice system is designed to end the 
fight over the defendant’s guilt once he has pleaded guilty and had a 
judgment of conviction entered by the federal district court.126  These 
conventions begin by requiring that an accused timely file a notice of 
appeal, and then discourage appellate litigation of guilt issues by 
liberally allowing plea agreements to provide for a waiver of appellate 
review, by providing that a guilty plea waives appeal of the conviction 
itself even where there has been no explicit waiver agreement, and by 
limiting appellate review to those issues actually raised by the 
defendant.127  The military justice system could not be more different, in 
that it: (1) provides for mandatory review of the findings of guilt in 
thousands of guilty plea cases each year; (2) prohibits waiver of 
appellate review as part of the plea bargaining process; (3) encourages 
appellate challenges to convictions in guilty plea cases by providing 
appellate defense counsel to pursue such challenges; and (4) requires an 
appellate court to independently determine that the record of trial 
supports a finding of guilt, even when the accused himself has made no 
 124. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 469 F.3d 568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The government 
is correct that an issue is deemed forfeited on appeal if it is merely mentioned and not developed.”); 
United States v. Alarid, 204 F. App’x 589, 590 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[I]ssues which are not 
specifically and distinctly argued and raised in a party’s opening brief are waived.”) (quoting Arpin 
v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Nealy, 
232 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, Defendant abandoned the indictment issue by not 
raising it in his initial brief.”); United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (The 
“failure to raise a theory as an issue on appeal constitutes a waiver because consideration of that 
theory would vitiate the requirement of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and our own local 
rules that, absent extraordinary circumstances, briefs must contain statements of issues presented for 
appeal . . . .” (quoting Int’l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d 1318 1327 n.11 (3d 
Cir. 1992))); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n argument not made in 
the opening brief is waived.”); United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1318 n.12 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(“As this court has consistently held, issues raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief are 
generally deemed waived.”); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (referencing 
the “settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some 
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 
1332 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Having failed to raise this issue in their briefs or at oral argument, the 
appellants abandoned this ground of appeal.”). 
 126. See supra notes 102-125. 
 127. See id. 
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such challenge on appeal.128  If we accept that the civilian criminal 
justice system reflects society’s conclusion that a baseline, respectable 
criminal justice system generally need not permit defendants who plead 
guilty to take the fight over the conviction itself to the appellate courts, it 
is a fair question whether it makes any sense to regularly impose these 
burdens on the military justice system.  As the following discussion will 
explain, it is this author’s view that there is no good reason to perpetuate 
this anachronistic aspect of the military justice system. 
B.  Mandatory Appellate Review Disserves the Policies Underlying the 
Military Justice System 
The problem with the military appellate system is not merely that it 
is different from its civilian counterpart; rather, the problem is that the 
military appellate structure – with its mandatory review of all courts-
martial reaching a relatively low punishment threshold – runs directly 
counter to the policies underlying every other aspect of the military 
justice system.  While the rest of the military justice system reflects the 
military’s greater need for finality and expedition, the extraordinary 
scope of appellate review runs against the grain to provide less finality 
and less certainty for courts-martial as compared to civilian 
proceedings.129  It makes little sense to construct a court-martial system 
that furthers the military’s interest in discipline, finality, and speed, and 
then to layer that system with an appellate review structure that 
undermines all of those interests. 
The Supreme Court “has recognized that the military is, by 
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.”130  The 
specialized and separate nature of the military community flows from 
the military’s constitutional duty “to fight or be ready to fight should the 
occasion arise.”131  In order to adequately perform “its mission, the 
military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit 
de corps.”132  And, unlike society at large, “[t]he military need not 
encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is 
required of the civilian state. . . .”133  Rather, “[t]he rights of military 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38 (1976) (noting “the difference between the 
diverse civilian community and the much more tightly regimented military community”). 
 130. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 
(1980). 
 131. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976). 
 132. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). 
 133. Id. 
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men must yield somewhat to meet certain overriding demands of 
discipline and duty.”134  As the Court has explained: 
To prepare for and perform its vital role, the military must insist upon 
a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.  
The laws and traditions governing that discipline have a long history; 
but they are founded on unique military exigencies as powerful now as 
in the past.135 
Where the law and the military intersect, the military’s enhanced 
needs for obedience, finality, and speed are pervasive influences in 
ordering the rights of servicemembers as against the United States 
government.  Perhaps most prominently, the Court has adopted the 
“military deference doctrine,” a jurisprudential construct by which the 
Court is far more deferential to the political branches when considering 
certain constitutional challenges to military regulations than the Court is 
when considering constitutional challenges in the civilian context.136  As 
an example, in Parker v. Levy,137 the Court rejected First Amendment 
and due process “void-for-vagueness” challenges to UCMJ provisions 
criminalizing “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” and 
“disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in 
the armed forces.”138  The Court’s analysis began with a consideration of 
the different government interests involved in “military” and “civilian” 
regulation: 
While the members of the military are not excluded from the 
protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of 
the military community and of the military mission requires a different 
application of those protections.  The fundamental necessity for 
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, 
 134. Brown, 444 U.S. at 354. 
 135. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975); see also Brown, 444 U.S. at 357 
(1980) (“Because the right to command and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this 
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess substantial discretion over its internal 
discipline.”); Levy, 417 U.S. at 743 (“An army is not a deliberative body.  It is the executive arm.  
Its law is that of obedience.  No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, 
or the duty of obedience in the soldier.” (quoting United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 
(1890))). 
 136. For a more comprehensive analysis of the military deference doctrine, see John F. 
O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV.161, 
214-306 (2000). 
 137. Levy, 417 U.S. at 733.. 
 138. Id. at 738.  “[C]onduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” is criminalized by Article 
133 of the UCMJ.  See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 933, art. 133 (2006).  “[D]isorders and neglects to the 
prejudice of good order and discipline” are criminalized by Article 134 of the UCMJ.  See id. § 934, 
art. 134. 
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may render permissible within the military that which would be 
constitutionally impermissible outside it.139 
Having made these observations, the Levy Court held that “[f]or the 
reasons which differentiate military society from civilian society, we 
think Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and 
with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former 
shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter.”140  
Therefore, the military’s heightened need for obedience and discipline 
allowed criminal statutes to withstand constitutional challenge when 
similar statutes might not pass constitutional muster in the civilian 
context.141 
Similarly, in holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel 
for servicemembers subjected to trial by summary court-martial,142 the 
Court concluded in Middendorf v. Henry143 that “presence of counsel 
will turn a brief, informal hearing which may be quickly convened and 
rapidly concluded into an attenuated proceeding which consumes the 
resources of the military to a degree which Congress could properly 
have felt to be beyond what is warranted by the relative insignificance of 
the offenses being tried.”144  Recognizing the special needs of the 
military, the Court further concluded that “[s]uch a lengthy proceeding is 
a particular burden to the Armed Forces because virtually all the 
participants, including the defendant and his counsel, are members of the 
military whose time may be better spent than in possibly protracted 
disputes over the imposition of discipline.”145  Indeed, over the past 
thirty-five years, the Court repeatedly, and consistently, has invoked the 
military deference doctrine to defeat due process,146 equal protection,147 
 139. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758. 
 140. Id. at 756. 
 141. Id. 
 142. A summary court-martial is a court-martial presided over by a military officer appointed 
by the commander who convened the court.  That officer acts as “judge, factfinder, prosecutor, and 
defense counsel.”  Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32 (1976).  The maximum sentence that can 
be imposed at a summary court-martial is confinement for one month, forty-five days’ hard labor 
without confinement, two months’ restriction, reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade, and 
forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month.  U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 820, art. 20 (2006). 
 143. Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 25. 
 144. Id. at 45. 
 145. Id. at 45-46; see also Levy, 417 U.S. at 743 (“The differences between the military and 
civilian communities result from the fact that ‘it is the primary business of armies and navies to 
fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955))). 
 146. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (“Neither Mathews nor Medina, 
however, arose in the military context, and we have recognized in past cases that the tests and 
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and First Amendment148 challenges to court-martial procedures or other 
federal regulations governing military affairs, where the same 
procedures and regulations would be constitutionally suspect in the 
civilian context. 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has fastened onto the peculiar 
needs of the military in erecting judge-made barriers to litigation by 
servicemembers against their military leadership.149  In a series of cases 
beginning in 1950, the Court created a judge-made exception to the 
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims 
Act,150 holding that Congress did not intend to permit suits by 
servicemembers or their survivors against the United States for injuries 
incident to military service.151  Three decades later, the Supreme Court 
applied similar reasoning to hold that servicemembers should not be 
permitted to bring a Bivens action152 alleging constitutional violations by 
their military superiors.153  After detailing the military’s need for 
reflexive obedience to orders, and “the peculiar and special relationship 
of the soldier to his superiors,”154 the Court based its decision on its 
judgment that the special needs of the military required two separate sets 
limitations [of due process] may differ because of the military context.” (internal quotations 
omitted) (alteration in original)); Middendorf, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976). 
 147. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (“In [the area of military affairs], as any 
other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause, but the tests and 
limitations to be applied may differ because of the military context.” (citation omitted).  Rostker 
involved a gender-based challenge to the Military Selective Service Act under the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Id. at 63. 
 148. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“These aspects of military life do not, 
of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment.  
But within the military community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in 
the larger civilian community.” (quotations and internal citations omitted) (alteration in original)); 
Brown, 444 U.S. at 354; Greer, 424 U.S. at 838. 
 149. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
 150. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
 151. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146; see also United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) 
(rejecting Federal Tort Claims Act suits by survivors of servicemembers injured incident to their 
military service); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 (1987) (holding that the Feres 
doctrine barred a Federal Tort Claims Act suit even where the defendant was not the 
servicemember’s military superior, but was a civilian government employee). 
 152. A “Bivens action” is a “suit for damages against federal officials whose actions violated 
an individual’s constitutional rights.”  Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983).  Even though 
Congress had not expressly authorized such suits, the Supreme Court allowed such suits to proceed 
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388-389 
(1971). 
 153. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304; see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-684 
(1987) (rejecting Bivens actions by servicemembers for alleged constitutional violations relating to 
their military service even where the defendant is a civilian government employee). 
 154. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). 
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of rules, one for the military and one for the civilian world: “The special 
status of the military has required, the Constitution contemplated, 
Congress has created and this Court has long recognized two systems of 
justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one for military 
personnel.”155  In all of these cases, the Court based its reasoning on the 
military’s special relationship with servicemembers, as well as the 
military’s need for instinctive obedience and its need to focus on 
national defense rather than litigation. 
Indeed, the military’s heightened interest in discipline, speed, and 
finality of litigation pervades the court-martial system established by 
Congress, as virtually every difference between civilian court practice 
and court-martial practice can be chalked up either to furthering these 
interests or as a nod to historical practice in the military.  Most 
obviously, the UCMJ allows for summary courts-martial, where an 
accused may be sentenced to confinement for one month and forfeiture 
of pay without having any right to representation by counsel.156  In 
upholding this practice against a due process challenge, the Supreme 
Court observed in Middendorf v. Henry157 that Congress’s refusal to 
provide counsel for summary courts-martial reflected the military’s 
interest in making summary courts-martial fast and informal so that the 
participants are not unduly diverted from their ordinary military 
duties.158  With respect to special courts-martial and general courts-
martial, where the accused has a right to counsel and the proceedings 
resemble civilian trials to a much greater degree, these same forces can 
be seen in the structure of proceedings as provided by Congress and the 
President. 
Rule for Court-Martial 707 requires that an accused be arraigned 
within one hundred twenty days of the earlier of the preferral of charges 
or the imposition of pretrial restraint against the accused.159  As the 
drafters’ analysis to R.C.M. 707 explains, this requirement protects not 
only an accused’s interest in a speedy trial, but also “protects the 
command and societal interest in the prompt administration of 
justice.”160  When an accused is placed in pretrial arrest or confinement, 
 155. Id. at 303-04. 
 156. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 820, art. 20 (2006). 
 157. Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 25. 
 158. Id. at 45-46. 
 159. R.C.M. 707(a).  R.C.M. 707 does permit the exclusion of certain periods of time from the 
calculation of the 120-day deadline for arraigning an accused with approval of the appropriate 
authority.  R.C.M. 707(c). 
 160. R.C.M. 707, Analysis; see also R.C.M. 707(a), Discussion (“Offenses ordinarily should 
be disposed of promptly to serve the interests of good order and discipline.”); United States v. 
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Article 10 of the UCMJ requires the Government to take “immediate 
steps” to bring the accused to trial, which can lead to a speedy trial 
violation even where the Government has complied with the deadline for 
arraignment imposed by R.C.M. 707.161 
Court-martial rules deviate from civilian practice in important ways 
in order to effectuate this speedy disposition of charges.162  The UCMJ 
provides an accused with an absolute right to appointed military defense 
counsel, without regard to financial need, for all general and special 
courts-martial.163  By providing all court-martial accuseds with 
appointed defense counsel, the military is able to ensure that an accused 
is represented by counsel at the earliest stages of the pretrial process, 
which will allow the case to proceed to trial in a quicker and more 
orderly fashion.164  Moreover, court-martial practice allows the accused 
to obtain much broader discovery from the government than defendants 
typically are permitted in civilian proceedings.165  As the CAAF has 
explained, this broader discovery to the defense under military practice 
“is designed to eliminate pretrial ‘gamesmanship,’ reduce the amount of 
pretrial motions practice, and reduce the potential for ‘surprise and delay 
at trial.’”166 
The actual trial of a court-martial is structured to further the 
military’s interest in finality and speed.167  Unlike civilian trials, there 
Carlisle, 25 M.J. 426, 427 (C.M.A. 1988) (“[I]t is in the Government’s interest that there be speedy 
disposition of charges.”). 
 161. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 810, art. 10; see United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258, 261 
(C.M.A. 1993) (noting that an accused could succeed on an Article 10 speedy trial motion even 
where the Government has complied with the speedy trial provisions of R.C.M. 707). 
 162. See R.C.M. 707, Analysis. 
 163. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(b), art. 27(b) (2006) (requiring that military defense counsel 
appointed to represent an accused at a general court-martial must be a judge advocate certified as 
competent to serve as defense counsel by the service judge advocate general); R.C.M. 502(d) 
(“Only persons certified under Article 27(b) as competent to perform duties as counsel in courts-
martial by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which the counsel is a member may be 
detailed as defense counsel or associate defense counsel in general or special courts-martial or as 
trial counsel in general courts-martial.”) 
 164. See R.C.M. 707(a), Discussion (“Offenses ordinarily should be disposed of promptly to 
serve the interests of good order and discipline.”). 
 165. United States v. Santos, 59 M.J. 317, 321 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“The military justice system 
provides for broader discovery than required by practice in federal civilian criminal trials.”); United 
States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 439 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (“The military justice system has been a 
leader with respect to open discovery and disclosure of exculpatory information to the defense.”); 
R.C.M. 701, Analysis (“Military discovery practice has been quite liberal” with “broader discovery 
than is required in Federal practice.”). 
 166. United States v. Jackson, 59 M.J. 330, 333-34 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (quoting R.C.M. 701, 
Analysis). 
 167. See R.C.M. 707, Analysis. 
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are no hung juries in courts-martial.  Article 52 of the UCMJ ensures 
that the court-martial members’ vote will result in a verdict.168  If two-
thirds or more of the members vote to convict on a particular charge, the 
accused is found guilty; if fewer than two-thirds vote to convict, the 
accused is found not guilty.169  Whether this departure from civilian 
norms favors or harms an accused is debatable.  On one hand, this 
practice denies the accused the benefit of the “holdout juror,” as the 
accused can be convicted on a divided vote.170  On the other hand, if the 
Government is unable to convince two-thirds of the members of the 
accused’s guilt, it cannot pursue a retrial based on a hung jury.171  What 
this rule does clearly favor, however, is the virtue of finality, as a verdict 
is going to be rendered at the court-martial regardless of whether the 
members reach unanimity on all, or any, of the charges.172 
The service Courts of Criminal Appeals are similarly structured to 
serve the interests of finality and expedition.  The Courts of Criminal 
Appeals are not bound by the trial court’s factual findings; rather, the 
Courts of Criminal Appeals have the power to make their own factual 
findings from the record of trial.173  Moreover, in appropriate 
circumstances, the Courts of Criminal Appeals have the power to make 
their own factual findings from outside the record of trial by considering 
affidavits on issues not raised or developed at trial, such as claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful command influence, or 
claims of pretrial punishment.174  This power allows the Courts of 
Criminal Appeals to make factual findings and resolve factual issues, in 
appropriate circumstances, without having to remand the case for 
 168. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2), art. 52(a)(2) (2006).  If death is a mandatory punishment 
for an offense, the accused may be convicted only upon a unanimous vote of guilty by the members.  
Id. § 852(a)(1), art. 52(a)(1). 
 169. Id. § 852(a)(2), art. 52(a)(2). 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. § 866(c), art. 66(c); United States v. Baker, 28 M.J. 121, 122 (C.M.A. 1989); 
United States v. Crider, 46 C.M.R. 108, 111 (C.M.A. 1973) (noting that Article 66(c) allows the 
Courts of Criminal Appeals to conduct a “de novo trial on the record at the appellate level”); see 
also David D. Jividen, Will the Dike Burst? Plugging the Unconstitutional Hole in Article 66(c), 
UCMJ, 38 A.F. L. REV. 63, 90 (1994) (analyzing service appellate courts’ use of their factfinding 
powers on appeal); John Powers, Fact Finding in the Courts of Military Review, 44 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 457, 465-68 (1992) (same); Martin D. Carpenter, Standards of Appellate Review and Article 
66(c): A De Novo Review?, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1990, at 37 (describing the Courts of Criminal 
Appeals as conducting a de novo review of the factual findings of courts-martial). 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 43 M.J. 192, 194 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (approving of 
service appellate court’s resolution of ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on affidavits 
rather than remanding action for factfinding at the trial level). 
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factfinding at the trial level.175  The CAAF has described Congress’s 
grant of factfinding powers in the Courts of Criminal Appeals as 
“unparalleled among civilian tribunals.”176 
The Courts of Criminal Appeals’ factfinding powers also allow 
them to avoid remand even where reversible error at trial requires that 
the adjudged sentence be vacated.177  When non-constitutional error at 
trial has affected the adjudged sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
is not necessarily required to remand the case for a new sentencing 
proceeding.178  If the court can determine that, without the error, the 
sentence would have been of a certain magnitude anyway, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals can reassess the sentence itself and approve the 
minimum sentence that the court determines would have been adjudged 
in the absence of error.179  If the error at trial was of constitutional 
magnitude, the Court of Criminal Appeals still can reassess the sentence 
rather than remanding the case if it is able to determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt the minimum sentence that would have been adjudged 
in the absence of the constitutional error.180  As with their ordinary 
factfinding powers, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power to cure 
defective sentencing proceedings by reassessing the sentence has the 
benefit of reducing the circumstances in which the remand or retrial of a 
court-martial is required. 
Thus, the military justice system generally is constructed to further 
the military’s interest in finality and efficient resolution of charges 
against a servicemember.181  The military’s interests in this regard do not 
flow solely from some abstract concept of the military’s need for 
unflinching obedience, though that certainly is part of the equation.182  
Trying a court-martial once is a burden on the military, as virtually all of 
the key players, with the exception of any witnesses who might be 
civilians, are military personnel diverted from other duties in order to 
 175. Id. (explaining the considerations that should inform the Courts of Criminal Appeals’ 
analysis of whether it can properly resolve a disputed issue through appellate factfinding as opposed 
to a remand for factual development at the trial level).  For a case in which the Court of Military 
Appeals, the predecessor to the CAAF, held that the lower court erred in making appellate findings 
of fact rather than remanding for an evidentiary hearing, see United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270, 
272 (C.M.A. 1993). 
 176. Baker, 28 M.J. at 122. 
 177. See United States v. Doss, 57 M.J. 182, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2001). 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id.; United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307 (C.M.A. 1986). 
 180. Doss, 57 M.J. at 185. 
 181. R.C.M. 707, Analysis. 
 182. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text. 
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participate in the court-martial.183  As a practical matter, retrials and 
remands are uniquely hard on the military, and the military justice 
system seeks to limit these burdens by allowing for non-unanimous 
verdicts, appellate factfinding, and sentencing reassessment on appeal.184  
The practical reasons why retrials and remands are particularly 
burdensome in the military context are not difficult to fathom. 
Courts-martial have worldwide jurisdiction.185  That is, military 
units conduct courts-martial wherever they are located, whether it is 
courts-martial in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, or in Afghanistan 
or Iraq during this century.  When a court-martial takes place in a 
combat theater, it may be impossible to conduct a retrial if victims or 
crucial witnesses are foreign nationals not under military control.  The 
problem is hardly any better when the court-martial takes place in the 
United States.  If a retrial is ordered a year or more after the original 
trial, it is highly likely that it will be difficult to gather all of the crucial 
witnesses even if they were military personnel.  Military units regularly 
deploy overseas, taking potential witnesses with them.  The key witness 
in last year’s court-martial may be guarding convoys in Iraq this year.  
Moreover, a servicemember typically can expect to transfer duty stations 
every few years, meaning that some percentage of trial witnesses will 
likely be located far from the site of the court-martial a year after trial.  
In addition to service-related transfers and deployments, servicemembers 
regularly leave the service for civilian life, often returning to their 
hometown or at least leaving the area where they last served in the 
military.  All of these factors combine to create a high likelihood that it 
will be difficult or impossible to secure the presence of important 
witnesses in the event that an appellate court orders a retrial of a court-
martial.  For all of these reasons, the military has a real, practical interest 
in trying offenses once, without the yo-yoing between the trial level and 
appellate level that is sometimes the cost of doing business in the 
civilian criminal justice system. 
Given these imperatives, it is a fair question why anyone ever 
would have created an appellate review system that is designed to take 
courts-martial where there was no controversy whatsoever – where the 
accused pleaded guilty and raised no motions, objections, or issues at 
 183. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 45-46 (1976) (noting that, with respect to courts-
martial, “virtually all the participants, including the defendant and his counsel, are members of the 
military whose time may be better spent than in possibly protracted disputes over the imposition of 
discipline”). 
 184. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text. 
 185. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 805, art. 5 (2006) (“This chapter applies in all places.”). 
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trial – and assign a government-funded appellate defense counsel to 
flyspeck the record to see if there is any conceivable basis for throwing 
out the findings and sentence and forcing a retrial.  This state of affairs is 
particularly hard to defend when civilian society – with none of the 
military’s unique interests in finality – would never allow defendants to 
plead out at the trial level and then simply continue the fight on 
appeal.186  Of course, the short answer is that nobody really did create 
this system for modern-day courts-martial; it just sort of happened.  
Providing for mandatory appellate review of guilty plea cases may have 
made sense when Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, but changes in 
court-martial practice remove whatever justification existed for the 
expansive appellate jurisdiction Congress created.  Simply put, this isn’t 
your grandfather’s military justice system. 
When Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, the court-martial 
system provided therein lacked many of the safeguards that military 
accuseds take for granted today.187  The courts-martial that existed under 
the UCMJ as first enacted did not even have a judge.188  Rather, general 
courts-martial had an assigned “law officer” who would provide legal 
advice to the court and perform some of the functions of a civilian judge, 
but who had none of the independence associated with a judge.189  For 
special courts-martial, there would not even be a law officer, with the 
assigned court-martial panel being expected to preside over the 
proceedings without the benefit of any legal advice or instruction 
whatsoever.190  This all changed, however, with the enactment of the 
Military Justice Act of 1968.191  The Military Justice Act of 1968 
amended the UCMJ to create the office of military judge and required 
that a military judge be assigned to all general courts-martial.192  For 
special courts-martial, the 1968 Act generally required appointment of a 
military judge if the court-martial were permitted to adjudge a punitive 
 186. Indeed, just thirty-five years before enactment of the UCMJ, the Judge Advocate General 
of the Army, General Enoch Crowder, advised the United States Senate that any appellate review of 
courts-martial was incompatible with the military mission: “In a military code there can be, of 
course, no provision for courts of appeal.  Military discipline and the purposes which it is expected 
to serve will not permit of the vexatious delays incident to the establishment of an appellate 
procedure.”  S. REP. NO.130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35, quoted in Wiener, supra note 11, at 18. 
 187. See generally Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Military Justice Act of 1968, 45 MIL. L. REV. 77 
(1969). 
 188. Id. at 81-82. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. The Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968). 
 192. Id. at 1335-36. 
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discharge from the service.193  This amendment to the UCMJ also 
provided for an independent judiciary by ensuring that military judges 
reported to the service Judge Advocate General and did not answer to 
local commanders.194 
The Military Justice Act of 1968 was a similar watershed as it 
related to an accused’s right to representation at courts-martial.  Prior to 
the 1968 amendments to the UCMJ, an accused had a right to qualified 
defense counsel at special courts-martial only if defense counsel was 
“available.”195  However, most of the services had taken the position that 
qualified defense counsel were not “available” for the defense of special 
courts-martial, which meant that an accused’s assigned counsel for 
special courts-martial typically would be a non-lawyer military officer 
assigned to present the accused’s defense.196  The Military Justice Act of 
1968 changed this state of affairs, and required the services to provide a 
qualified lawyer to represent accuseds at special courts-martial 
empowered to adjudge a punitive discharge.197  Moreover, while the 
 193. The Military Justice Act of 1968 left open the theoretical possibility that a special court-
martial authorized to adjudge a punitive discharge could proceed without a military judge if “a 
military judge could not be detailed to the trial because of physical conditions or military 
exigencies.”  Id. at 1336.  However, that standard is so exacting that it seems virtually impossible 
that the government could survive appellate review of a special court-martial authorized to adjudge 
a punitive discharge without having detailed a military judge to the court.  As R.C.M. 201 explains: 
Physical conditions or military exigencies . . . may exist under rare circumstances, such 
as on an isolated ship on the high seas or in a unit in an inaccessible area, provided 
compelling reasons exist why trial must be held at that time and at that place.  Mere 
inconvenience does not constitute a physical condition or military exigency and does not 
excuse a failure to detail a military judge. 
R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(B)(ii)(b). 
 194. Military Justice Act of 1968, supra note 191, at § 2 (codified at U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 
826(c), art. 26(c)); see also Wiener, supra note 11, at 63 (noting that, prior to the 1968 amendments 
to the UCMJ, law officers assigned to courts-martial in the Navy and Air Force generally were 
under the control of the same officer who convened the court-martial and referred the charges 
against the accused for trial by court-martial). 
 195. See Ervin, supra note 187, at 83 (“Although the Uniform Code originally provided that an 
accused in a general court-martial must be represented by a lawyer counsel, it provided that an 
accused in a special court-martial may be represented by his own hired civilian lawyer or by a 
military lawyer of his selection ‘if reasonably available,’ or, otherwise, by an appointed non-lawyer 
counsel.” (footnote omitted)). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  With respect to special courts-martial not empowered to adjudge a punitive discharge, 
the statute still required the appointment of qualified defense counsel “unless counsel having such 
qualifications cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military exigencies.”  
Military Justice Act of 1968, supra note 191, at § 2 (codified at U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(1), 
art. 27(c)(1)).  This “military exigency” exception for special courts-martial not empowered to 
adjudge a punitive discharge was intended by Congress to apply only when it was truly impossible 
to detail a qualified defense counsel because of geographic isolation or combat conditions, Ervin, 
supra note 189, at 86, and the statute required a detailed statement in the record of the reasons why 
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1968 UCMJ amendments left open the theoretical possibility that, in 
certain extraordinary situations, the services could decline to provide 
counsel at special courts-martial not authorized to adjudge a punitive 
discharge, military practice after the 1968 Act had been to assign 
qualified defense counsel for all special courts-martial.198  In 1984, the 
President amended Rule for Court-Martial 502(d)(1) to reflect this 
practice and require, without exception, that qualified defense counsel be 
detailed to represent the accused at all general and special courts-
martial.199 
When this evolution of the UCMJ is considered, it becomes more 
understandable why Congress, acting in 1950, would create an appellate 
review system that cut against the principles of finality and speed 
underlying the rest of the UCMJ.200  When Congress created this 
appellate structure, it was designing an appellate review system for 
courts-martial where there would be no judge, much less an independent 
judge, and not even a “law officer” for special courts-martial.201 For 
special courts-martial, not only would there be no judge or law officer, 
but the accused was not even being represented by a trained lawyer.202  
Thus, courts-martial as they existed upon enactment of the UCMJ had a 
notable absence of any gatekeepers to protect the accused’s rights and to 
properly advise him of his options.203  In that context, one can see why 
Congress might view even guilty pleas as at least potentially suspect and 
erect an appellate review system to provide some degree of gatekeeping 
for all courts-martial exceeding a stated punishment threshold.204 
But in present-day courts-martial, every single accused at a general 
it was impossible to detail qualified defense counsel.  Military Justice Act of 1968, supra note 191, 
at § 2 (codified at U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(1), art. 27(c)(1)). 
 198. R.C.M. 502(d), Analysis. 
 199. Id. 
 200. As Colonel Wiener has observed, Congress enacted the UCMJ and created civilian 
appellate review of courts-martial at a time when virtually the entire English-speaking world was 
doing the same.  Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, while Great Britain provided for civilian 
appellate review in 1951, Canada did so in 1952, New Zealand did so in 1953, and Australia 
followed suit in 1955.  Wiener, supra note 11, at 37.  Of course, accepting the concept of civilian 
review of courts-martial is not at all incompatible with the notion that the category of cases subject 
to such review should sensibly reflect the various policy interests underlying the military justice 
system, from the military’s needs to the accused’s legitimate interest in seeking appellate 
vindication. 
 201. Ervin, supra note 187, at 89. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See Powers, supra note 173, at 465 (opining that the mandatory appellate review of 
Article 66(c) “operates from a premise that the finding of guilty and the sentence reached by the 
trial court are incorrect”). 
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or special court-martial has trained legal counsel assigned to him at 
government expense.205  They also have an independent military judge 
who does not answer to local commanders.206  These enhanced 
procedural protections at the trial level address the reliability concerns 
that, in an earlier age, might have justified a bulky appellate review 
system even when the trial-court process was structured to enhance 
speed and finality.207  This is particularly true where American society 
has already concluded as a matter of policy that civilians pleading guilty 
in federal court have a much more limited right to appellate review of 
their cases.208  To the extent that the anomalous nature of courts-martial 
justified a more expansive appellate review system than that existing in 
federal court, those days have long passed and cannot justify providing 
less finality to court-martial convictions in light of the military’s 
comparatively greater need for certainty and finality. 
C.  The Military’s Prohibition on Negotiated Appellate Review Waivers 
Bucks the Trend of Allowing Accuseds to Trade Their Rights for 
Sentencing Relief 
Article 66(c) of the UCMJ,209 which provides for mandatory 
appellate review of courts-martial where the approved punishment 
exceeds a statutory threshold, is not, by itself, the cause of the bloated 
and unwieldy appellate review process that currently exists.  Rather, the 
real problem is the manner in which Article 66(c) interfaces with R.C.M. 
705(c), which prohibits accuseds from waiving their appellate rights as 
part of the plea bargaining process.210  The argument against limiting a 
servicemember’s plea bargaining rights flows from two facts concerning 
the civilian and military criminal justice systems. 
First, as discussed above, criminal defendants in the federal court 
system, unlike their military counterparts, can bargain away their right to 
appellate review as part of the plea bargaining process.211  Indeed, a 
waiver of appellate review is so standard a part of the federal court plea 
bargaining process that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure even 
specify the inquiry a federal court must make of a criminal defendant 
 205. R.C.M. 502(d)(1). 
 206. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 826(c), art. 26(c) (2006). 
 207. See R.C.M. 707, Analysis. 
 208. See supra Part III.A. 
 209. § 866(c), art. 66(c). 
 210. See id.; R.C.M. 705(c). 
 211. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text. 
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when a plea agreement includes a waiver of appellate rights.212  Second, 
the rules for military practice do not even prohibit an accused from 
waiving his right to appeal, but only prohibit an accused from waiving 
his right to appeal as part of a pretrial agreement.213  A military accused 
is permitted to waive appellate review, but can do so only after the 
military commander who convened the court-martial has taken action on 
the findings and sentence, meaning that a military accused can waive 
appellate review only at a time where it is certain that he can receive 
nothing of value for relinquishing this right.214 
That a military accused can waive appellate review, so long as he 
receives no benefit for doing so, undermines any potential policy 
argument for prohibiting the waiver of appellate rights as part of a 
pretrial agreement.215  The basis for R.C.M. 705(c) cannot be that there 
is something so fundamental about the military appellate process that 
appellate review should be inherently unwaivable, as the rules do permit 
military accuseds, like their civilian counterparts, to waive appellate 
review; the rules merely deprive the military accused of any incentive to 
do so.216  Rather, a sound policy rationale would have to point to 
something unique to the military plea bargaining process itself that 
supports allowing accuseds to waive appellate review so long as it is not 
done as part of plea negotiations, keeping in mind that civilians are 
regularly permitted to waive their appellate rights during their own plea 
negotiations.217 
Indeed, R.C.M. 705(c) runs counter to the trend in both civilian and 
military law of allowing criminal defendants to bargain away their most 
cherished rights during the plea bargaining process.  Most notably, in 
United States v. Mezzanatto,218 the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant’s agreement, as a condition to entering into plea bargaining 
discussions, that any statement he made in the plea bargaining process 
would be admissible against him was enforceable against the defendant 
even though the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal Rules 
of Evidence provide that statements made in plea discussions are not 
admissible against the defendant.219  After acknowledging the general 
 212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).  
 213. R.C.M. 705(c). 
 214. Indeed, the Rules for Courts-Martial prohibit any person from offering a servicemember 
an inducement, such as clemency, to waive appellate review.  Id. § 1110(c). 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See supra note 105. 
 218. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
 219. Id. at 210. 
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presumption that constitutional and statutory rights are waivable by a 
criminal defendant,220 the Court observed that eliminating constraints on 
the permissible subjects for a plea agreement furthers, rather than 
undermines, the criminal justice system’s interest in encouraging 
settlement of criminal charges: 
Indeed, as a logical matter, it simply makes no sense to conclude that 
mutual settlement will be encouraged by precluding negotiation over 
an issue that may be particularly important to one of the parties to the 
transaction.  A sounder way to encourage settlement is to permit the 
interested parties to enter into knowing and voluntary negotiations 
without any arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips.  To use the 
Ninth Circuit’s metaphor, if the prosecutor is interested in “buying” the 
reliability assurance that accompanies a waiver agreement, then 
precluding waiver can only stifle the market for plea bargains.  A 
defendant can “maximize” what he has to “sell” only if he is permitted 
to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.221 
Apart from rights identified in R.C.M. 705(c), the military courts 
similarly follow this “free market” approach to plea agreements by 
generally allowing military accuseds to bargain away their rights in 
return for the benefits that they are able to obtain through the plea 
bargaining process.222  For example, the military appellate courts have 
upheld terms in a pretrial agreement that require an accused to agree to 
trial before a military judge alone, thereby waiving the accused’s right to 
trial by members.223  Similarly, the military courts have upheld pretrial 
agreements where the convening authority agreed to one sentence 
limitation if the accused waived trial before members but would insist 
upon a higher sentence limitation if the accused desired to be sentenced 
by members.224  Military accuseds may waive their right to challenge the 
legality of a search and seizure,225 or to object to hearsay evidence on 
sentencing,226 or to challenge venue,227 or to assert a claim of illegal 
pretrial punishment,228 or to confront and cross-examine witnesses,229 or 
 220. Id. at 201. 
 221. Id. at 208. 
 222. For an in-depth discussion of the development of military case law on waiver of rights in 
the plea bargaining process, see Mary M. Foreman, Let’s Make a Deal! The Development of 
Pretrial Agreements in Military Criminal Justice Practice, 170 MIL. L. REV. 53, 70-84 (2001). 
 223. United States v. Burnell, 40 M.J. 175, 176 (C.M.A. 1994). 
 224. United States v. Andrews, 38 M.J. 650, 650-51 (A.C.M.R. 1993). 
 225. United States v. Jones, 23 M.J. 305, 307 (C.M.A. 1987). 
 226. United States v. Gibson, 29 M.J. 379, 382 (C.M.A. 1990). 
 227. United States v. Kitts, 23 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A. 1986). 
 228. United States v. McFadyen, 51 M.J. 289, 289 (C.A.A.F. 1999). 
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to insist on an Article 32 investigation of charges referred for trial by 
general court-martial, the military equivalent to a grand jury 
proceeding.230 
What, then, is the policy rationale for prohibiting military accuseds 
from plea bargaining away their right to appeal when civilian defendants 
are permitted to do so and military accuseds are generally allowed to 
bargain away their other constitutional and statutory rights?  The CAAF 
explained its view of the rationale behind R.C.M. 705(c) in its recent 
decision in United States v. Tate,231 a case in which the court invalidated 
a pretrial agreement term whereby the accused agreed not to seek parole 
or clemency for twenty years.232  The CAAF explained that the UCMJ 
allows the military justice system to be administered principally by local 
military commanders throughout the world, but vests review and 
clemency functions with centrally-located appellate courts and senior 
executive branch officials.233  The court viewed R.C.M. 705(c) as 
protecting this balance by eliminating the local commander’s ability to 
affect the appellate review process through plea bargains that would take 
away appellate review.234  Based on that premise, the CAAF concluded 
that R.C.M. 705(c) protects the accused in a plea bargaining process 
where a power differential exists: “R.C.M. 705(c) recognizes that the 
bargaining relationship between a servicemember and the convening 
authority at the pretrial stage is fundamentally different from the 
circumstances in which rights may be waived during trial and post-trial 
proceedings.”235 
Putting aside whether this analysis is in fact the thinking that led to 
the promulgation of R.C.M. 705(c), does that line of reasoning really 
stand up to scrutiny?  If R.C.M. 705(c) is really designed to keep the 
court-martial convening authority from using plea bargaining leverage to 
affect the appellate review process, the rule does an extraordinarily poor 
job of it.  As discussed above, the military justice system allows an 
accused to bargain away a panoply of his constitutional and statutory 
rights in a way that can make appellate review in many ways a hollow 
exercise.236  A convening authority is even permitted to enter into a 
pretrial agreement whereby the accused waives claims of unlawful 
 229. United States v. Hanna, 4 M.J. 938, 940 (N-M.C.M.R. 1978). 
 230. United States v. Shaffer, 12 M.J. 425, 429-430 (C.M.A. 1982). 
 231. United States v. Tate, 64 M.J. 269 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 
 232. Id. at 272. 
 233. Id. at 270. 
 234. Id. at 271. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text. 
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command influence by the convening authority in the charging 
process.237  Moreover, it hardly makes good logical sense to address 
perceived limitations on an accused’s bargaining power with respect to 
his right to appellate review by taking away all of the accused’s 
bargaining power, which is exactly what R.C.M. 705(c) does with 
respect to an accused’s appellate rights.238 
Perhaps the best explanation as to why it might make sense to allow 
an accused to bargain away many of his potential appellate arguments, 
but not the right to appeal itself, is that the rule protects an accused’s 
ability to get up on appeal, out of the clutches of a nefarious convening 
authority, and then present evidence that he was improperly coerced into 
pleading guilty or waiving other important rights in the plea bargaining 
process.  But R.C.M. 705(c) does not even really protect against that risk 
particularly well.  For example, R.C.M. 705(c) does nothing to eliminate 
the theoretical risk that a convening authority might coerce an accused to 
waive his appellate rights through threats external to the court-martial 
process.239  Rather, all R.C.M. 705(c) does is prevent a convening 
authority using his role within the court-martial process to induce (or 
coerce) an accused to waive appellate review.240  A diabolical convening 
authority, one hell-bent to eliminate an accused’s appellate rights, 
theoretically could, after he takes action on the court-martial record, 
threaten the accused with dangerous assignments or extra duties if the 
accused did not waive appellate review, and therefore achieve his 
malevolent goal that way.  If the accused went along with the scheme 
and waived appellate review, no one would ever know because the 
record of trial would never go up on appeal.241 
Thus, in prohibiting plea agreement terms that waive appellate 
review, R.C.M. 705(c) really protects only against the possibility that a 
convening authority might use his legal status as the convening authority 
in an illegal way to coerce an accused to plead guilty and waive some of 
the arguments that he normally would be able to raise on appeal.  One 
 237. United States v. Weasler, 43 M.J. 15, 19 (C.A.A.F. 1995). 
 238. R.C.M. 705(c) (“A term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall not be enforced if it 
deprives the accused of . . . the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate rights.”). 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See R.C.M. 1110(g) (providing that a waiver of appellate review bars review of the court-
martial by a Court of Criminal Appeals and by the service Judge Advocate General).  Of course, the 
Rules for Courts-Martial prohibit any person from inducing or coercing an accused to waive 
appellate review.  See R.C.M. 1110(c).  But if R.C.M. 705(c) is a prophylactic rule designed to 
protect against the lawless convening authority who is determined to use his position unlawfully to 
coerce a waiver of appellate rights, such a convening authority presumably would feel no 
compunction about violating R.C.M. 1110(c) as well. 
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theoretical example that comes to mind is that a diabolical (and lawless) 
convening authority could coerce an accused to plead guilty, and to 
waive all issues other than those that cannot be waived under R.C.M. 
705(c), by telling the accused that he will use his power as convening 
authority to appoint a “hanging jury” that is likely to convict the accused 
and sentence him harshly.  R.C.M. 705(c) would offer some protection 
against this improbable scenario by ensuring that an accused is able, 
once the convening authority has acted on the court-martial record, to go 
up on appeal and assert a claim of unlawful command influence or 
otherwise seek to overturn his plea of guilty. 
But there are already other protections in the military justice system 
against such malevolence.242  An accused is assigned a defense counsel 
whose duties run solely to the accused and not to the service or the 
convening authority.243  The defense counsel negotiates a pretrial 
agreement on behalf of the accused, and presumably would be fully 
aware of any illegal threats by the convening authority to taint the court-
martial process if the accused does not plead guilty and waive any 
waivable appellate issues.244  Moreover, each and every plea agreement 
must be examined by the military judge, who also does not answer to the 
convening authority, to ensure that the accused voluntarily entered into 
the agreement and is voluntarily pleading guilty.245  Included in that 
inquiry is a requirement that the military judge question the accused to 
ensure that all of the terms of the pretrial agreement, and any promises 
made in connection therewith, are contained in the written agreement 
itself.246 
Therefore, when one unravels the rationale behind R.C.M. 705(c), 
the prohibition on an accused bargaining away his right to appeal at most 
protects an accused in only two situations.  First, the rule protects the 
accused from having a convening authority legally insist that the accused 
waive his right to appellate review if the accused wants to obtain a plea 
 242. See, e.g., U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §827(a), art. 27(a) (2006). 
 243. Id. 
 244. R.C.M. 705(d)(1) (“Government representatives shall negotiate with defense counsel 
unless the accused has waived the right to counsel.”). 
 245. See R.C.M. 910(f)(4); see also United States v. Jones, 23 M.J. 305, 308 (C.M.A. 1987) 
(noting the requirement that the military judge conduct an inquiry to ensure that the accused 
understands the effect of all pretrial agreement terms, that the written agreement includes all 
promises made as part of the pretrial agreement, and that the parties agree with the military judge’s 
interpretation of the agreement); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453, 456 (C.M.A. 1976) (same). 
 246. See R.C.M. 910(f)(4) (requiring the military judge to inquire to ensure “[t]hat the accused 
understands the agreement” and “[t]hat the parties agree to the terms of the agreement”); see also 
R.C.M. 705(d)(2) (“All terms, conditions, and promises between the parties shall be written.”). 
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agreement by making such negotiations illegal.247  Of course, an accused 
has no right to a pretrial agreement in the first place,248 so it is 
questionable at best whether it makes any sense to deprive the accused 
of a bargaining chip in the pretrial process on that basis. 
Second, R.C.M. 705(c) protects an accused from being illegally 
coerced to plead guilty and waive important appellate rights.  But this 
protection would come into play only in those instances where the 
accused and/or his counsel affirmatively lie to the military judge by 
failing to disclose at trial that the convening authority procured the 
pretrial agreement through illegal threats, and then only where the 
accused (after lying to the military judge at trial) tells the truth to the 
appellate courts.  To protect against this improbable scenario, the 
military justice system erects a system of appellate review that 
essentially ensures that all courts-martial, even those where the accused 
has pleaded guilty and raised no motions at trial, are subjected to full-
blown appellate review once the approved sentence exceeds a modest 
threshold.249  To say this is a case of the tail wagging the dog understates 
the issue, as the problem purportedly addressed by Rule 705(c) is 
smaller than the proverbial “tail,” and the resulting burden on the 
military justice system as a whole is considerably larger than the “dog.” 
D.  Mandatory Appellate Review of Guilty Plea Cases Encourages 
Undesirable Litigation Conduct 
The essence of a plea bargain is that the litigants stop fighting, with 
the defendant relinquishing his right to contest the charges against him 
in return for dismissal of certain of the charges and/or sentencing 
relief.250  But that is not the way it works in the military justice system, 
as a plea bargain does not end the fight, but only shifts the fight to the 
military appellate courts, where the accused can take positions directly 
contrary to those he took at trial in the hopes of obtaining appellate 
relief.  Moreover, the peculiarities of military practice impose 
considerable burdens on the military in those cases in which the accused 
is successful in this about-face strategy. 
The cornerstone of a plea bargain in the military justice system is 
that the accused agrees to plead guilty to specified charges in return for 
 247. See R.C.M. 705. 
 248. United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 247 (C.A.A.F. 1995); United States v. Conklan, 41 
M.J. 800, 804 (C.A.A.F. 1995); United States v. Helweg, 32 M.J. 129, 134 (C.M.A. 1991). 
 249. See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006). 
 250. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971); Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
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the convening authority’s agreement to place limitations on the 
accused’s sentence and/or to drop some of the charges against the 
accused.251  That is, when the accused has a pretrial agreement, he is 
getting something in return for successfully pleading guilty, and the 
accused therefore is motivated to have the military judge accept his 
guilty pleas.252  This process is complicated somewhat because the 
military does not recognize Alford pleas,253 where an accused can plead 
guilty without admitting his guilt.254  Rather, a military accused pleading 
guilty at a court-martial must admit his guilt and, in response to a 
providence inquiry from the military judge, admit facts sufficient to 
establish his guilt of the charged offense.255  Therefore, in order for an 
accused to obtain the benefits of his pretrial agreement, he must be an 
advocate at trial of his own guilt in convincing the military judge to 
accept his plea.256 
Having made that deal, and advocated at trial that his providence 
inquiry establishes his guilt, an accused often has every incentive to take 
precisely the opposite position on appeal.  Armed with a new, 
government-funded, appellate defense counsel, the accused is permitted 
under military practice to go up on appeal and argue that the military 
judge should not have accepted the accused’s guilty pleas, the very pleas 
the accused urged the military judge to accept, by arguing that material 
came out at the court-martial that was inconsistent with the accused’s 
guilty pleas.257  If the accused succeeds in convincing a military 
appellate court that the military judge erred in accepting his guilty pleas, 
the accused’s conviction will be overturned and the case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
The accused’s institutional incentive to challenge his own plea of 
guilty on appeal is a direct product of the UCMJ.  Article 63 of the 
UCMJ provides that on a rehearing, the approved sentence for a charge 
 251. R.C.M. 705(b).  The convening authority also sometimes agrees to refer the charges 
against the accused to a particular type of court-martial in return for the accused’s agreement to 
plead guilty to some or all of the charges preferred against him.  See R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(A). 
 252. See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61 (1971). 
 253. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
 254. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 255. See R.C.M. 910(e) (“The military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without making 
such inquiry of the accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a factual basis for the 
plea.  The accused shall be questioned under oath about the offenses.”). 
 256. See id. 
 257. This is not a mere theoretical problem.  The military justice case reporters are replete with 
cases of an accused contending on appeal that his guilty plea was improvident.  See supra note 123 
(citing a sample of cases in which accuseds argued on appeal that their guilty pleas at trial were 
improvident). 
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may not exceed that approved at the first court-martial.258  Therefore, if 
an accused can convince a military appellate court to throw out his guilty 
pleas as improvident, the accused can go back to the court-martial and 
plead not guilty, or he can plead guilty once again and clear up whatever 
defects existed in the original providence inquiry.  Either way, the 
accused’s approved sentence on rehearing can only stay the same or get 
better at the second court-martial.259 
The one quasi-exception to this principle arises when the accused’s 
approved sentence from his first court-martial was reduced from that 
adjudged at trial because of a pretrial agreement.260  In such a case, if the 
accused fails to abide by his pretrial agreement on rehearing, then the 
maximum available sentence is the sentence actually adjudged, and not 
the sentence as reduced by the convening authority.261  For example, 
imagine an accused is charged with aggravated assault.262  The accused 
enters into a pretrial agreement whereby he agrees to plead guilty to the 
charge in return for suspension of all confinement in excess of two 
years.  The accused pleads guilty and is sentenced to five years’ 
confinement, and the convening authority duly suspends all confinement 
in excess of two years.  If, on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
finds the accused’s guilty plea improvident, the approved sentence on 
rehearing cannot exceed that approved at the first court-martial – two 
years’ confinement with another three years’ confinement suspended – 
so long as the accused continues to plead guilty as required by his 
pretrial agreement.263  If, however, the accused decides to plead not 
guilty at his rehearing or otherwise breaches his pretrial agreement, he 
loses the benefit of his pretrial agreement but still has his confinement 
capped at the five years adjudged at his prior court-martial.264 
But where the accused “beats the deal,” and is adjudged a sentence 
at trial that is not reduced by a pretrial agreement, he has absolutely 
nothing to lose by trying to overturn his prior guilty pleas and taking his 
shot at a rehearing.265  Thus, taking the example from the previous 
paragraph, assume the accused entered into a pretrial agreement whereby 
he agreed to plead guilty to the aggravated assault charge and the 
convening authority agreed to suspend all confinement in excess of two 
 258. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 863, art. 63 (2006). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id.; see also R.C.M. 810(d)(2). 
 262. See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 928, art. 128 (2006). 
 263. R.C.M. 810(d)(1). 
 264. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 863, art. 63; R.C.M. 810(d)(2). 
 265. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 863, art. 63. 
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years.  At trial, however, the military judge (who is not aware of the 
sentence limitations in the accused’s pretrial agreement)266 sentences the 
accused to confinement for only one year.  In that case, the pretrial 
agreement did not actually reduce the accused’s sentence, although it 
provided the accused certainty that, no matter what happened at trial, his 
confinement would be capped at two years.  After trial, however, the 
accused knows that the pretrial agreement did not actually reduce his 
sentence, and has nothing to lose by advocating on appeal that his own 
voluntary plea of guilty be thrown out and the case remanded, because 
the worst the accused can do on rehearing is the one year of confinement 
he already has, and he can do even better if he is acquitted on retrial or is 
convicted but sentenced to less than one year in confinement.267 
Similarly, it is a fairly common practice for a convening authority 
to take relatively serious charges that ordinarily might be referred to a 
general court-martial and agree to refer them to a special court-martial, 
which cannot adjudge confinement in excess of one year,268 in return for 
the accused’s agreement to plead guilty to the charges at the less severe 
forum.269  Take, for instance, an accused charged with two specifications 
of drug distribution.  At a general court-martial, the accused could be 
sentenced to fifteen years’ confinement for each specification, or a total 
of thirty years’ confinement.270  A convening authority might agree to a 
“bareback special” pretrial agreement where he agrees to refer the 
charges to a special court-martial in return for the accused’s agreement 
to plead guilty to the charges.  Thus, even if the accused is sentenced to 
confinement for one year, the maximum allowed at a special court-
martial, the accused still has obtained a significant sentencing benefit 
from his pretrial agreement because he capped his confinement at one 
year by agreeing to plead guilty at a lesser forum.  In such a case, 
however, the UCMJ provides an institutionalized incentive for the 
accused to try to get his guilty pleas overturned on appeal.  Having 
already obtained the significant sentencing benefit provided by referral 
of the charges to a lesser forum, the accused can keep the benefit of his 
pretrial agreement (which effectively capped his confinement at one 
 266. See R.C.M. 910(f)(3) (providing that the military judge shall not be advised of the 
sentence limitation terms of a pretrial agreement until he has adjudged a sentence at the court-
martial). 
 267. R.C.M. 810(d)(1). 
 268. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 819, art. 19. 
 269. See R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(A) (noting that a pretrial agreement may involve an agreement by 
the convening authority to refer the charges to a particular type of court-martial). 
 270. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Part IV (2005), 37(e)(2) (setting 
maximum punishment for a specification of drug distribution). 
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year) even if he decides to plead not guilty at a rehearing, as Article 63 
of the UCMJ caps confinement at the one year previously adjudged even 
if the accused violates his pretrial agreement. 
A recent case demonstrates the perverse incentives that exist even 
outside the context of guilty pleas and providence inquiries.  In United 
States v. Tate,271 the accused was charged with, among other serious 
offenses, premeditated murder.  Facing the prospect of confinement for 
life without the possibility of parole, the accused entered into a pretrial 
agreement that would suspend all confinement in excess of fifty years.272  
The pretrial agreement included an additional term, however, one in 
which the accused agreed neither to seek nor accept clemency or parole 
for the first twenty years of his confinement.273  Presumably, this 
provision was inserted into the pretrial agreement in order to give 
assurance to the convening authority that he could provide Tate with 
sentencing protection while still ensuring that Tate would remain off the 
streets for a considerable period of time, as the rules that then existed 
would have made Tate eligible for consideration for clemency after only 
five years and for parole consideration after only ten years.274  At Tate’s 
court-martial, he was convicted of premeditated murder and other 
offenses, and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.275  As 
required under the pretrial agreement, the convening authority 
suspended all confinement in excess of fifty years.276 
On appeal, however, Tate argued that the military appellate courts 
should throw out the portions of his pretrial agreement affecting the 
availability of clemency and parole.277  Tate argued that these provisions 
– which the accused presumably had used to induce the convening 
authority into capping confinement at fifty years – violated public policy 
and R.C.M. 705(c), which prohibits pretrial agreements from interfering 
with “the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate 
rights.”278  The CAAF agreed, and held that the provision in the pretrial 
agreement affecting Tate’s eligibility for clemency and parole was 
unenforceable, even though Tate reaped a significant benefit from 
 271. United States v. Tate, 64 M.J. 269 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 
 272. Id. at 271. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 269. 
 276. Tate, 64 M.J. at 269. 
 277. Id. 
 278. R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B). 
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making that offer in dodging a sentence of confinement for life without 
the possibility of parole.279 
Putting aside whether the CAAF’s resolution of the legal issue in 
Tate was correct, do we really want to have a military justice system that 
allows an accused to urge a military judge to accept a pretrial agreement 
a trial and then get up on appeal and have his new appellate defense 
counsel argue that the very terms that the accused negotiated, accepted, 
and urged the military judge to accept should be thrown out?  Do we 
really want a system that creates an institutional incentive for accuseds 
to plead guilty at trial, and urge the military judge to accept their pleas, 
and then turn around and tell an appellate court that the military judge 
erred in accepting the very pleas that the accused urged the military 
judge to accept?  One could reasonably argue that these perverse 
incentives are overstated because the standard for trying to overturn a 
guilty plea as improvident is fairly high, requiring a showing that matters 
submitted at the court-martial are materially inconsistent with the 
accused’s plea of guilty.280  But that high standard makes this process 
even more perverse, as countless hours are devoted to appeals of guilty 
plea cases – from preparation of a record of trial straight through 
drafting of an appellate opinion – where there is little prospect of 
success, and where there is “success” it seems unwarranted given the 
positions taken by the accused at trial.  And the beauty of it all is that the 
United States government is footing the bill by assigning appellate 
defense counsel281 to assist an accused in making arguments directly 
inconsistent with the positions he and his prior government-funded 
defense counsel asserted at trial.282 
The harm suffered by the military from such conduct extends 
beyond the mere cost of funding an appeal.  When an accused is facing 
trial by court-martial, the government presumably is ready to try its case 
on the merits.  When the accused takes a pretrial agreement and pleads 
guilty, there is no trial on the merits.  Now, fast-forward a year or two, 
and in those cases in which the appellate courts find the accused’s plea 
improvident, the government is in a far worse position vis-à-vis actually 
trying the merits of the case than it was when the accused pleaded guilty.  
Years have passed.  Memories fade.  Witnesses scatter.  In the military 
context, it is more than possible that key witnesses will be deployed 
overseas, or on a ship, or in a combat zone.   
 279. Tate, 64 M.J. at 272. 
 280. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra Part III.D. 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized these unique logistical 
difficulties in upholding the military appellate courts’ power to reassess 
a sentence, rather than remand for new sentencing proceedings, when 
some but not all charges are dismissed on appeal: 
[T]he nature of a court-martial proceeding makes it impractical and 
unfeasible to remand for the purpose of sentencing alone.  Even 
petitioner admits that it would now, six years after the trial, be 
impractical to attempt to reconvene the court-martial that decided the 
case originally.  A court-martial has neither continuity nor situs and 
often sits to hear a single case.  Because of the nature of military 
service, the members of a court-martial may be scattered throughout 
the world within a short time after a trial is concluded.283  
  Thus, all of the practical realities unique to court-martial practice 
make it much harder for the military to try a court-martial two years 
down the road from when it was first ready to proceed with trial, and the 
only reason for the delay is that the accused agreed to plead guilty as 
part of a pretrial agreement in the first place. 
The civilian courts have a term for the type of chicanery that the 
military justice system encourages, where a defendant urges the trial 
judge to do something and then argues to an appellate court that the trial 
judge erred in complying.  It is called “invited error,” and defendants are 
regularly barred from urging error under such circumstances.284  There is 
no reason why the military justice system should be constructed in a way 
that not only fails to discourage invited error, but regularly gives the 
accused an incentive to make such arguments. 
 283. Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1957). 
 284. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A defendant cannot 
insist during trial that the jury be kept in ignorance yet demand after its end that he receive a lower 
sentence because the jury did not pass on the very issue that had been withheld at his request.”); 
United States v. Martin, 119 F. App’x. 645, 649 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Though [defendant] never 
expressly requested that the two charges be tried together, a joint trial was the obvious consequence 
of counsel’s request to have the charges consolidated.  She therefore invited any potential joinder 
error in this case.”); United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A] defendant in a 
criminal case cannot complain of error which he himself has invited.” (quoting United States v. 
Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1994))); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11th Cir. 
2003) (“Importantly, however, even plain error review is unavailable in cases where a criminal 
defendant ‘invites’ the constitutional error of which he complains.”); United States v. LaHue, 261 
F.3d 993, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action 
by a court and later seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was in error.” (quoting 
United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000))). 
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E.  Mandatory Appellate Review of Courts-Martial Diverts Resources 
From Court-Martial Appeals Involving Issues Actually Contested At 
Trial 
Heretofore, the arguments offered against the appellate review of 
all courts-martial exceeding a particular punishment threshold have 
focused on the competing interests of the accused and the military.  But 
the costs of this broad appellate review are not borne solely by the 
military.  Rather, the current rules for appellate review impose 
opportunity costs that prejudice accuseds who actually contested their 
guilt or raised other issues at their courts-martial.285 Resources expended 
in the appellate review process for a court-martial where the accused 
pleaded guilty and raised no issues are resources taken away from 
appellate review of a court-martial where an accused raised substantial 
issues that he seeks to vindicate on appeal, and necessarily delays the 
appellate review of truly contested courts-martial.286  Given the 
extraordinary delays that have arisen in the appellate review of courts-
martial in recent years, there is good reason to conclude that the 
appellate system should weed out some portion of these guilty-plea 
appeals so that cases raising substantial issues can move up in line for 
appellate review. 
In the past few years, the CAAF and service Courts of Criminal 
Appeals have been confronted with a spate of cases in which the accused 
has alleged a due process violation resulting from the inordinate amount 
of time it has taken his case to proceed from the court-martial through a 
decision on the first level of appeal.287  The facts relating to the delay in 
some of these cases do not paint a pretty picture.  In United States v. 
Moreno288 – one of the leading post-trial delay cases decided by CAAF 
– the accused was convicted of rape and sentenced to, among other 
things, a dishonorable discharge and confinement for six years.289  
However, it took 1,688 days (or nearly five years) from the time of 
Moreno’s court-martial for the Court of Criminal Appeals to issue an 
opinion on the first level of appellate review.290  By the time the CAAF 
ruled in Moreno’s case, and incidentally reversed his conviction based 
on the military judge’s failure to grant a challenge for cause, nearly 
 285. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
 286. See id. 
 287. See id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 132. 
 290. Id. at 136. 
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seven years had lapsed from the date Moreno was sentenced.291  By 
then, of course, Moreno had served his entire sentence.292  The CAAF 
found that the post-trial delay in Moreno’s case had the effect of denying 
him due process, and in so doing excoriated the military for the 
widespread nature of su
Delays have been tolerated at all levels in the military justice system so 
much so that in many instances they are now considered the norm.  
The effect of this opinion is to provide notice that unreasonable delays 
that adversely impact an appellant’s due process rights will no longer 
be tolerated.293 
Indeed, in assessing claims of unreasonable post-trial delay, the 
CAAF has explained that it can constitute a denial of due process, even 
when the accused has not been prejudiced by the delay, when “the delay 
is so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s 
perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system.”294  
Under that standard, the CAAF has found that delays in appellate review 
of a number of cases were so lengthy and indefensible that the public 
would view these delays as negatively affecting the fairness of the court-
martial system as a whole.295 
One of the factors causing delays in appellate review has been what 
the CAAF has called the “extremely large caseload” assigned to 
appellate defense counsel.296  That is, appellate defense counsel are, at 
times, assigned so many cases that they cannot review the records of 
trial and brief them all without taking multiple extensions of time, which 
creates much of the inordinate post-trial delay that the CAAF has found 
inconsistent with due process rights.  But as discussed in Part II of this 
Article, court-martial accuseds compete against each other not only for 
the attention of their assigned appellate defense counsel, but also for the 
time spent by court reporters transcribing courts-martial proceedings; 
and of trial counsel, defense counsel, and military judges reviewing and 
authenticating the record of trial; and of defense counsel preparing 
 291. Id. at 133. 
 292. See id. 
 293. Id. at 143. 
 294. United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 24 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
 295. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Haney, 64 M.J. 101, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. 
Gosser, 64 M.J. 93, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 
2006); see also United States v. Dearing, 63 M.J. 478, 488 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that post-trial 
delay amounted to a due process violation where the accused had demonstrated prejudice arising 
from the delay). 
 296. Haney, 64 M.J. at 108; see also Moreno, 63 M.J. at 137 (“While appellate defense 
counsel’s caseload is the underlying cause of much of this period of delay . . . .”). 
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clemency packages; and of command staff judge advocates preparing 
recommendations for the convening authority; and of convening 
authorities acting on the adjudged findings and sentence; and of 
appellate judges considering and ruling on whatever issues are raised on 
appeal.297 
Flooding the appellate review pipeline with cases where the 
accused pleaded guilty and raised no issues at trial, but where the 
accused has a statutory entitlement to the same full-blown appellate 
review as any other accused, unquestionably imposes costs on the 
government, many of which are detailed above.298  But the biggest 
victim of this one-size-fits-all appellate review process might be the 
accused who vigorously asserted his innocence at trial but is languishing 
in confinement while the appellate review process deals with unworthy 
appeals that are ahead of him in the appellate pipeline.  While it is true 
that part of this problem can be fixed by devoting additional personnel 
and resources at all levels of the appellate review process, from court 
reporters to appellate judges, it would be foolish to survey the problem 
of post-trial delay without considering whether the appellate review 
system can be reformed in a way that streamlines the appellate review 
process while simultaneously protecting the legitimate rights of accused 
as recognized by American notions of criminal justice and due process. 
IV.  A MARKET-BASED REFORM OF THE MILITARY APPELLATE 
PROCESS 
Two levers are at work to create the mindlessly uniform system of 
appellate review that currently exists.  Article 66(c) of the UCMJ 
requires full-blown appellate review of all courts-martial where the 
approved punishment includes a punitive discharge or confinement for 
one year or more, unless the accused has waived or withdrawn appellate 
review.299  R.C.M. 705(c) ensures that virtually no accuseds will waive 
or withdraw appellate review because the rule prohibits the waiver of 
appellate review as part of a plea bargain negotiation, and instead allows 
an accused to waive appellate review only after the convening authority 
has acted.300  In fact, because the military provides an accused with 
appellate defense counsel at government expense, it is actually easier for 
the accused to go forward with appellate review than to waive it 
 297. See supra Part II. 
 298. See supra notes.49-90 and accompanying text. 
 299. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006). 
 300. R.C.M. 705(c). 
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(because he doesn’t have to bother himself with signing anything), and it 
does not cost the accused a dime to do so.301  For that reason, even the 
completely ambivalent accused almost invariably goes through with 
appellate review because there is no effort required to do so. 
Because the flood of court-martial appeals arises from the 
combined effect of these two rules, adjusting either the scope of 
appellate review provided under Article 66(b) or R.C.M. 705(c)’s 
prohibition on dealing away appellate rights potentially could remedy 
the problem.  Therefore, one possibility would be to permit appellate 
review of a smaller universe of cases.  For example, the UCMJ could be 
amended to conform to civilian practice and require that an accused file 
a notice of appeal if he desires to appeal his court-martial conviction or 
sentence.  Such a change, however, seems likely to be both unworkable 
and ineffective.  Courts-martial take place all over the world, but appeals 
are centralized in Washington, D.C., in the Courts of Criminal Appeals 
and CAAF.  Because appeals generally take place far from the locus of 
the trial, it is impractical for the accused’s trial defense counsel to 
continue with the case on appeal.  When the trial defense counsel knows 
that the case is going to be passed off to appellate defense counsel in 
Washington, D.C., and that the appeal costs his client nothing in terms of 
time or money, why would a trial defense counsel ever counsel his client 
not to notice an appeal?  Therefore, while requiring a notice of appeal 
theoretically might peel off of the appellate review rolls a few of the 
ambivalent accuseds, it seems more likely that their trial defense counsel 
would convince them to take their shot on appeal because there literally 
is nothing to lose.  Thus, shifting to a notice of appeal system likely 
would accomplish little other than adding an additional piece of 
paperwork that an accused would execute in winding up his relationship 
with his trial defense counsel. 
Another possible way to lighten the appellate caseload would be to 
increase the punishment threshold that triggers a right of appeal.  For 
example, Congress could amend Article 66(b) to allow review by the 
Courts of Criminal Appeals only where the approved sentence is two 
years or more (instead of one year), or eliminate an appeal by right to the 
Courts of Criminal Appeals in guilty plea cases.   
These are not new ideas.  The service judge advocates general and 
the judges on the Court of Military Appeals (the predecessor to CAAF) 
made a recommendation to Congress as far back as 1953 that the UCMJ 
 301. U.C.M.J.,10 U.S.C. § 870(a), (c), art. 70(a), (c); R.C.M. 1202(a), (b)(2). 
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be amended to make appeals from guilty plea cases discretionary.302  
Because there is no constitutional right to appeal of a criminal 
conviction,303 a narrowing of the cases in which an accused has a right to 
appeal presumably would pass constitutional muster.  While such a 
scheme would reduce the number of courts-martial subject to appellate 
review, and likely reduce the delays in post-trial review, it would slice 
off the wrong class of cases.  Raising the punishment threshold that 
triggers Article 66(c) appellate review would deny appeals to accuseds 
who vigorously contested their cases at trial, raising substantial legal 
issues, but whose sentences were relatively light.  In a similar vein, 
substantial legal issues can arise during court-martial sentencing 
proceedings, and a change in Article 66(b) that denies a right to appeal 
in guilty plea cases would effectively prevent servicemembers from 
challenging, through an appeal of right, irregularities in sentencing 
proceedings if they pleaded guilty to the charged offenses.  Neither 
change would get at what should be the target of any reform to the court-
martial appellate process, the relatively large number of cases where the 
accused pleads guilty and raises no substantial issues at his court-
martial.304 
A better candidate for reform is R.C.M. 705(c).  Amending R.C.M. 
705(c) to allow an accused to waive his right to appellate review as part 
of a pretrial agreement would not directly reduce the number of cases 
eligible for Article 66(c) review, but its indirect effect likely would be 
considerable.  If pretrial agreements could include terms whereby the 
accused waives appellate review, it seems highly likely that convening 
authorities, presumably with prompting from their staff judge advocates, 
would seek such waivers as part of pretrial agreements, and accuseds 
who intended to plead guilty and had no real issues to raise at trial likely 
would be perfectly willing to bargain away those rights in return for 
sentencing relief.  That is the beauty of attacking the size of the appellate 
caseload through R.C.M. 705(c).  Where tinkering with the class of 
cases eligible for appellate review under Article 66(c) would 
involuntarily take appellate rights away from convicted servicemembers, 
amendment of R.C.M. 705(c) would eliminate appellate review only for 
accuseds who are volunteers.  That is, elimination of the right of appeal 
is not forced on anyone, as any accused who truly values appellate 
review, and intends to raise issues at trial that ultimately could be 
 302. Carlton L. Jackson, Plea-Bargaining in the Military: An Unintended Consequence of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 179 MIL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2004). 
 303. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). 
 304. See supra Part III.D. 
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vindicated on appeal, can retain his appellate rights by refusing to 
bargain them away. 
This minor adjustment to R.C.M. 705(c) likely would address, in 
large part, every one of the reasons identified in Part III of this Article 
for doing something to address the universe of cases subjected to 
appellate review.  This change would further the military’s interest in 
finality by eliminating appellate proceedings for a significant portion of 
the courts-martial where the accused agrees to plead guilty pursuant to a 
plea bargain.305  The amendment also would bring R.C.M. 705(c) more 
in line with civilian practice, and other aspects of military practice for 
that matter, by allowing criminal defendants to bargain away their rights 
in a way that allows them to negotiate a benefit for relinquishing those 
rights.306  Amending R.C.M. 705(c) also would eliminate much of the 
undesirable litigation conduct that the current appellate review system 
not only tolerates, but encourages.307  Much of the undesirable litigation 
conduct identified in this Article involves the accused inviting error by 
advocating his guilt at trial in order to keep his pretrial agreement and 
then taking the opposite position on appeal.308  If you assume that the 
standard practice would be that pretrial agreements would include 
appellate review waivers, the accused motivated to protect his pretrial 
agreement will plead guilty and there will be no opportunity for him to 
do an about-face on appeal because the typical case would not be 
appealable.  And perhaps most important, if appellate review waivers 
became a fairly common provision in pretrial agreements, which seems 
likely if R.C.M. 705(c) were amended, it would have a considerable 
effect on the size of the appellate caseload, and should allow the actors 
in the appellate review process to focus on cases raising substantial 
issues and speed the overall pace of post-trial processing.309  Moreover, 
by focusing on R.C.M. 705(c), a reform of the appellate review process 
would affect only guilty plea cases, and only those guilty plea cases 
where any potential appellate issues are sufficiently insubstantial that the 
accused would rather have a pretrial agreement than a right to appeal. 
There are two potential counterarguments against amending R.C.M. 
705(c), but neither of them can overcome the substantial arguments in 
favor of such a change.  First, the argument can be made that allowing 
appellate review waivers as an optional pretrial agreement clause would 
 305. See supra Part III.B. 
 306. See supra Part III.C. 
 307. See supra Part III.D. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See supra Part III.E. 
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have the effect of making it a mandatory clause, as convening authorities 
might be unwilling to enter into pretrial agreements if the accused insists 
on full-blown appellate review.  But is that a concern really worth 
protecting?  An accused has no right to a pretrial agreement.310  The 
essence of the plea bargaining system is that the government conserves 
resources by not having to litigate criminal cases in return for offering 
the accused protection on charges and sentence.311  Why, then, should 
the military plea bargaining system encourage an accused to make a deal 
at trial and raise no issues, and then have the accused inflict considerable 
costs on the government through appellate review?  There is nothing 
wrong with requiring an accused to make a consistent choice between 
peace and war.  If he values his appellate rights, then he should decline a 
pretrial agreement, if one is available only upon a waiver of appellate 
rights, and fight with vigor at both trial and appeal.  If the accused places 
a greater value on reducing his sentence at trial, then he should enter into 
the pretrial agreement and waive his right to appeal.  To those who 
would complain that the effect of an amendment to R.C.M. 705(c) would 
make appellate review waivers a nearly mandatory clause in pretrial 
agreements, this author can only state that he would certainly hope that 
this would be the effect, as the current system of “peace at trial but war 
on appeal” is indefensible. 
The other, perhaps more difficult, argument is that if appellate 
review waivers became a more or less mandatory provision in pretrial 
agreements, there would be accuseds who will get appellate relief under 
the current system but will get no such relief under a reformed system 
because they will have waived their right to appellate review.  As a 
factual matter, this premise is undeniably true.  But, again, is that an 
interest worth protecting?  Civilian courts are well past this concern, as 
criminal defendants regularly waive appellate review of their 
convictions, and those waivers are upheld so long as they are knowing 
and voluntary.312  As a result, there are unquestionably civilian accuseds 
who have pleaded guilty to offenses of which they technically might not 
be guilty, or might not be provably guilty, and the civilian justice system 
nevertheless marches on with the response that accuseds desiring to 
 310. United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 247 (C.A.A.F. 1995). 
 311. United States v. Perron, 58 M.J. 78, 87 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (“There are numerous benefits to 
pleading guilty [in accordance with a plea agreement].  A plea of guilty ensures the prompt 
application of correctional measures; avoids delays; amounts to an acknowledgement of guilt and 
acceptance of responsibility; and avoids the risks of a contested trial.  Guilty pleas also help 
preserve limited resources and relieve the victim[s] of the trauma of testifying.” (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
 312. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
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vindicate themselves should not plead guilty at trial, and certainly should 
not agree to waive their appellate rights.  Moreover, the military justice 
system’s requirement of a providence inquiry ensures that the military 
accused, as opposed to his civilian counterpart, has at least convinced his 
trial judge of his technical guilt of the offenses to which he has pleaded 
guilty.313 
In that sense, the change in R.C.M. 705(c) proposed by this Article 
still would be more protective of military accuseds than civilian practice.  
While civilian practice typically finds waiver of guilt issues through 
entry of a plea of guilty, reforming R.C.M. 705(c) would not affect all 
accuseds who plead guilty, but only those who plead guilty pursuant to a 
pretrial agreement in which they agree to waive their appellate rights.  
Thus, the only affected accuseds would be those who, in assessing their 
own priorities, would rather have the sentencing relief of a pretrial 
agreement than the lottery ticket of appellate rights for accuseds who 
raise no substantial issues at trial.  It is not too much to ask for an 
accused desiring to raise legal issues on appeal to raise and preserve 
them at trial, where the court is often better equipped to deal with any 
factual issues that might underlie the accused’s arguments.  And if the 
accused would rather not raise issues at trial because he wants the 
benefit of a pretrial agreement, does it really make any sense to leave the 
appellate doors open so that the accused can make those same arguments 
later?  If an accused who would get appellate relief under the current 
system would lose that relief under an amended R.C.M. 705(c), the 
reality is that any such loss would be the accused’s own choice, a 
consequence of his decision that he is better off declaring peace than 
declaring war. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In assessing the current state of appellate review in the military 
justice system, the one argument that certainly cannot be made is that “if 
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  The military justice system recently has been 
plagued with egregious delays in appellate review that are a direct 
byproduct of an appellate review system that treats all courts-martial 
alike once the approved punishment exceeds a modest threshold.  But all 
courts-martial are not alike.  Sometimes, the accused pleads not guilty 
and raises numerous legal issues through aggressive motions practice.  
Sometimes, the accused pleads guilty pursuant to a pretrial agreement to 
 313. R.C.M. 910(e). 
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an offense for which he has no colorable defense, and raises no issues 
whatsoever at trial.  Indeed, sometimes that accused even asks for the 
punishment he ultimately receives, such as the disgruntled soldier who 
goes absent without leave because he wants out of the service and then 
asks the military judge to give him a punitive discharge when he is 
caught and court-martialed.  It makes little sense to accord both types of 
cases precisely the same type of appellate review. 
The root cause of the bloated military appellate process is R.C.M. 
705(c), which prevents an accused from bargaining away his appellate 
rights as part of a plea bargain.  If this prohibition were removed, either 
by presidential amendment of R.C.M. 705(c), or a congressional 
amendment of the UCMJ to overrule R.C.M. 705(c), it would have a 
salutary effect on the military appellate system.  Court-martial appeals 
would focus more on cases that were actually contested at trial, and 
would limit the extent to which cases that were uncontested at trial 
clogged up the appellate pipeline.  And the effect of such a change on 
accuseds would be perfectly fair, as no accused would be denied 
appellate review unless he agreed to it, unless he decided that he was 
better off with a plea bargain than appellate review of his court-martial.  
The ambivalent accused almost uniformly could be expected to opt for 
the pretrial agreement, which is exactly what should happen.  The result 
would be a more respectable military justice system; one that reflects the 
military’s interest in finality and the accused’s interest in an expeditious 
appellate review process, while ensuring that the only accused who 
would lose their right to appeal are those who voluntarily elect to do so. 
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